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Contractual Evolution
Matthew Jennejohn,† Julian Nyarko†† & Eric Talley‡
Conventional wisdom portrays contracts as static distillations of parties’
shared intent at some discrete point in time. In reality, however, contract terms
evolve in response to their environments, including new laws, legal interpretations,
and economic shocks. While several legal scholars have offered stylized accounts of
this evolutionary process, we still lack a coherent, general theory that broadly captures the dynamics of real-world contracting practice. This paper advances such a
theory, in which the evolution of contract terms is a byproduct of several key features,
including efficiency concerns, information, and sequential learning by attorneys
who negotiate several deals over time. Each of these factors contributes to the underlying evolutionary process, and their relative prominence bears directly on the speed,
direction, and desirability of how contractual innovations diffuse. Using a formal
model of bargaining in a sequence of similar transactions, we demonstrate how different evolutionary patterns can manifest over time, in both desirable and undesirable directions. We then take these insights to a real-world data set of over two thousand merger agreements negotiated over the last two decades, tracking the adoption
of several contractual clauses, including pandemic-related terms, #MeToo provisions, Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) conditions,
and reverse termination fees. Our analysis suggests that there is not a one-size-fitsall paradigm for contractual evolution. Rather, the constituent forces affecting term
evolution manifest in varying strengths across differing circumstances. We highlight
several constructive applications of our framework, including how the study of contract negotiation unfolds when price cannot easily be adjusted and how to incorporate other forms of cognitive and behavioral biases into our general framework.
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INTRODUCTION
Most corporate transactions win deservedly scant attention
in the popular press. But every so often, one becomes the centerpiece of cocktail-party conversation. Such a deal came along in
November 2019, when iconic U.S. luxury-goods maker Tiffany &
Co. disclosed that it was being acquired by LVMH Moët Hennessy
Louis Vuitton (LVMH), the French luxury-goods giant, in a
$16.2 billion transaction.1 When the tie-up was announced, there
1
See Press Release, LVMH & Tiffany & Co., LVMH Reaches Agreement with
Tiffany & Co. 1 (Nov. 25, 2019), https://perma.cc/4BAX-KAQL; see also Holly Ellyatt,
LVMH Confirms Deal to Acquire Tiffany for $16.2 Billion, CNBC (Nov. 25, 2019),
https://perma.cc/L93T-36J4; Roberta Naas, LVMH Acquires Tiffany & Co. for $16.2 Billion, FORBES (Nov. 26, 2019), https://perma.cc/E6C4-PYJR.
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were plenty of reasons for optimism. The deal came in the middle
of the longest-running economic expansion in U.S. history,2 and,
in all respects, it looked like the latest blockbuster marriage in a
string of shrewd acquisitions during the tenure of LVMH’s chairman, Bernard Arnault, whose storied dealmaking had fortified
the LVMH empire.3 If there was any question surrounding the
deal, it was about whether LVMH could pull Tiffany out of its
longstanding struggle to attract younger clientele.4 Brushing such
concerns aside, LVMH’s CFO confidently quipped that “[l]ove will
prevail.”5 LVMH and Tiffany’s love story, however, was starcrossed from the start. Only three months after the deal was announced—and well before its scheduled closing—the coronavirus
pandemic overwhelmed the global economy, ushering in the deepest economic contraction in modern memory.6 LVMH and Tiffany
were forced to shutter many locations, with no dependable timeline for reopening.7 A transaction that once looked like a rocket

2
See
Business
Cycle
Dating,
NAT’L
BUREAU
OF
ECON.
RSCH.,
https://perma.cc/WCV9-6YPL; U.S. Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions, NAT’L
BUREAU OF ECON. RSCH. (last updated July 19, 2021), https://perma.cc/ZQS7-J43V; see
also Carmen Reinicke, The US Economic Expansion Is Now the Longest in History, MKTS.
INSIDER (July 2, 2019), https://perma.cc/2XYT-8T88; David John Marotta, Longest Economic Expansion in United States History, FORBES (Jan. 21, 2020), https://perma.cc/D3STKM9Q.
3
See Vanessa Friedman, Bernard Arnault Just Bought Tiffany. Who Is He?, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 25, 2019), https://perma.cc/ELQ5-RAAD.
4
See Chauncey Alcorn, Tiffany Needs to Attract Millennials. The Company that
Hired Rihanna and A$AP Rocky Wants to Help, CNN BUS. (Oct. 29, 2019),
https://perma.cc/9MJW-Y5B4; Subrat Patnaik & Siddharth Cavale, Tiffany’s ‘Old-World
Luxury’ Fails to Charm Millennials, REUTERS (May 26, 2016), https://perma.cc/KXZ6CJ29; Vauhini Vara, Tiffany’s Sparkly Surge Reflects a Divided Moment in America, THE
ATLANTIC (Aug. 29, 2018), https://perma.cc/MRP3-HCMT; Dora Mekouar, Millennials Not
Interested in Tiffany Jewelry, Gap Clothes, VOA (Feb. 25, 2020), https://perma.cc/36ERAQUX.
5
Amie Tsang & Vanessa Friedman, Luxury Giant LVMH to Buy Tiffany for
$16.2 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2019), https://perma.cc/UE8H-KMCG.
6
See Nelson D. Schwartz, Coronavirus Recession Looms, Its Course ‘Unrecognizable’, N.Y TIMES (Mar. 21, 2020), https://perma.cc/J547-CVYH; Alan Rappeport & Jeanna
Smialek, I.M.F. Predicts Worst Downturn Since the Great Depression, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14,
2020), https://perma.cc/4PPD-Y4D3; Press Release, World Bank Group [WBG], COVID-19
to Plunge Global Economy into Worst Recession Since World War II, WBG
Doc. 2020/209/EFI (June 8, 2020), https://perma.cc/3LY9-VD89.
7
See Tiffany & Co to Temporarily Shut Several Stores, Cuts Hours at Others,
REUTERS (Mar. 17, 2020), https://perma.cc/MR88-FJ37; Kim Bhasin, LVMH Says Revenue
Has Dropped as Much as 20% Due to Coronavirus, BLOOMBERG, (Mar. 27, 2020),
https://perma.cc/NKT8-FAN6; Patrick M. Graham, Tiffany Indicates Coronavirus Outbreak Will Cause Significant Hit to 2020 Results, PROACTIVE (Mar. 20, 2020),
https://perma.cc/AWV4-VMKV; John Harrington & Samuel Stebbins, 30 of America’s
Iconic Businesses That Closed Due to Coronavirus, USA TODAY (Apr. 10, 2020),
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ship now more closely resembled a train wreck, and LVHM indicated that it would look for a way out.8
In the end, it was not love that prevailed; rather, it was a
contract. Buried within the seventy-page agreement that memorialized the LVMH-Tiffany merger was a provision that provided
LVMH with the potential off-ramp that it so desperately sought.
One of the conditions of LVMH’s obligation to close the transaction was that Tiffany’s business would not have experienced a material adverse effect (MAE), the equivalent of a force majeure
(“Act of God”) provision that appears in myriad other contracts.9
LVMH seized on the language, declaring that the pandemic had,
in fact, visited an MAE on Tiffany’s operations, and LVMH therefore had the right to walk away from the deal.10
Tiffany responded in the way that jilted lovers sometimes
do—by litigating. In the Delaware Court of Chancery, it argued
that the force majeure provision had several exclusions that prevented LVMH from treating COVID-19 as an MAE.11 LVMH
countered by observing that while there were indeed several express exclusions pertaining to natural and political disasters, the
contract was silent as to public-health crises in general (and
COVID-19 in particular). In fact, they argued, the meticulous inclusion of a list of very specific, express exclusions made it all the
more convincing that pandemic-related events had been deliberately omitted from the list of exclusions.12
Setting aside the merits of these arguments, the overall economics of the merger still appeared strong, and the costs and risks

https://perma.cc/ZG4M-LEAQ; Jonathan Garber, Tiffany & Co. Loses $65M as Coronavirus Shutters Stores, FOX BUS. (June 9, 2020), https://perma.cc/V54B-EL3J.
8
See, e.g., Lauren Hirsch & Elizabeth Paton, Tiffany’s $16 Billion Sale Falls Apart
in Face of Pandemic and Tariffs, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2020), https://perma.cc/3HC8-43S3.
9
Tiffany & Co., Agreement and Plan of Merger 62 (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1) (Nov. 25,
2019), https://perma.cc/NRU9-74RA.
10 See LVMH’s Verified Counterclaim and Answer to Verified Complaint ¶¶ 37–40,
55–56, Tiffany & Co. v. LVMH Moët Hennessy-Louis Vuitton SE, No. 2020-768 (Del. Ch.
Sept. 28, 2020), 2020 WL 5870414; see also Press Release, LVMH (Sept. 9, 2020),
https://perma.cc/26MW-2ZXG; see also Hirsch & Paton, supra note 8; Timeline: LVMH
Calls Off $16 Billion Tiffany Takeover, REUTERS (Sept. 9, 2020), https://perma.cc/Z5MVL9BW; Amelia Lucas & Lauren Thomas, LVMH Scraps $16.2 Billion Deal with Tiffany,
CNBC (Sept. 9, 2020), https://perma.cc/U556-ELYW; Anne D’Innocenzio, Luxury Goods
Giant LVMH Cancels $14.5B Deal for Tiffany, WASH. POST (Sept. 9, 2020),
https://perma.cc/M7JB-KLPM.
11 See Verified Complaint ¶ 5–6, Tiffany & Co., No. 2020-768.
12 LVMH’s Verified Counterclaim and Answer to Verified Complaint, supra
note 10, ¶ 4.
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of litigating the outcome were appreciable. It was therefore unsurprising that in late 2020, the parties returned to the negotiating table to recut the deal. They ultimately agreed to shave the
purchase price by about a half-billion dollars, short-circuiting the
uncertain outcome of LVMH’s efforts to escape the deal.13
Although Tiffany’s dowry had shrunk considerably, it was not to
suffer the Whistledown-worthy14 humiliation of being left at the
altar.15
While the LVMH–Tiffany dispute made international headlines, its basic facts recount a saga that has played out repeatedly
during the pandemic. Over the last year, an unprecedented series
of corporate transactions have immersed the Delaware courts in
MAE claims.16 And beyond the context of mergers and acquisitions (M&A), similar claims arising out of changed circumstances
have increased dramatically in many commercial and noncommercial settings, ranging from supply chains to higher education
to Hollywood.17

13

See Press Release, LVMH & Tiffany & Co., Tiffany and LVMH Modify Merger
Price (Oct. 29, 2020), https://perma.cc/TZ3Q-TXVW; see also Sarah White & Silvia Aloisi,
LVMH and Tiffany End Luxury Battle, Cut Price on $16 Billion Takeover, REUTERS (Oct.
29, 2020), https://perma.cc/ZDD2-C58G; David Dawkins, Billionaire Bernard Arnault
Snags $400 Million Price Reduction in High-Risk Tiffany Takeover Talks, FORBES (Oct.
29, 2020), https://perma.cc/WF4W-4FMQ; Vanessa Friedman & Elizabeth Paton, Tiffany
Deal Is a Signature Move by the Sun Tzu of Luxury, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2020),
https://perma.cc/3SJ7-SDC2.
14 For those who are unfamiliar, see James Poniewozik, ‘Bridgerton’ Is a Sparkly
Period Piece with a Difference, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2020), https://perma.cc/5XXN-8Y4J.
15 The deal closed on January 7, 2021. Tiffany & Co., Current Report (Form 8-K)
(Jan. 7, 2021), https://perma.cc/J23C-VE32; Press Release, LVHM, LVMH Completes the
Acquisition of Tiffany & Co. (Jan. 7, 2021), https://perma.cc/4D5C-CBRS.
16 See generally, e.g., AB Stable VIII, LLC v. MAPS Hotel & Resorts One, LLC,
No. 2020-310, 2020 WL 7024929 (Del. Ch. Nov. 30, 2020); Realogy Holdings Corp. v.
SIRVA Worldwide, Inc., No. 2020-311, 2020 WL 4559519 (Del. Ch. Aug. 7, 2020); Verified
Complaint, The We Co. v. Softbank Grp. Corp., No. 2020-258 (Del. Ch. Apr. 7, 2020); Verified Complaint, XHR Santa Barbara, LLC v. SBG US Holdings PTE, No. 2020-395 (Del.
Ch. May 22, 2020); Yatra Online, Inc. v. Ebix, Inc., No. 2020-444, 2021 WL 3855514 (Del.
Ch. Aug. 30, 2021); Verified Complaint, SPay, Inc. v. Stack Media, Inc., No. 2020-540 (Del.
Ch., July 1, 2020).
17 See Tim McCarthy, COVID-19 and Force Majeure: A Closer Look at the Supply
Chain Clause of the Moment, INDUSTRYWEEK (July 9, 2020), https://perma.cc/K8QV-6V3S;
Jessica Everett-Garcia, Keith Miller, T. Markus Funk & Evelyn Pang, These Defenses May
Help Universities in Covid-19 Lawsuits, BLOOMBERG L. (Aug. 14, 2020),
https://perma.cc/G2DV-7HGH; David Robb & Nellie Andreeva, SAG-AFTRA Addresses
Talks with Studios on “Applicability of Force Majeure” for Actors Impacted by COVID-19
Shutdown, DEADLINE (Apr. 23, 2020), https://perma.cc/4ZAW-2SJX; Lee Brenner & Adam
Kwon, How Hollywood COVID-19 Force Majeure Claims May Play Out, LAW360 (Mar. 27,
2020), https://perma.cc/P4NF-RLZ2.
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For lawyers and those studying the law, part of the allure of
these disputes stems from their foundational origins in basic contract law. Whether it pertains to a corporate combination,18 a conceiving cow,19 a closed canal,20 or a cancelled coronation,21 courts
have long struggled to assess whether, when, and how the law
should intervene in contractual risk allocation during moments of
unanticipated surprise or severe economic dislocation.22 But the
role of the law in this process is not limited to litigated outcomes.
Even before the phalanx of Tiffany and LVMH lawyers filed their
complaints, a different set of legal actors—transactional lawyers—played a critical role in crafting the language of the written
contract itself. Their language was destined to be parsed in excruciating detail to determine whether and how it allocated risks
and uncertainties around yet-to-unfold events.
This contract-design task is no mean feat: as economic conditions change, the choices made by these transactional attorneys
can tip the balance of risks and incentives for trillions of dollars’
worth of agreements. Accordingly, drafters must carefully consider whether an evolving environment requires them to write
new, untested provisions to address each emerging risk. Interestingly, the lawyers making these decisions often work alone and
with little input from other stakeholders such as CEOs, CFOs,
boards, or investment bankers. When lawyers hammer out these
terms, those stakeholders will have left the negotiating table, satisfied that they could reach a consensus on the most essential attributes of the deal, such as the price.
What makes this dynamic especially compelling is how frequently it unfolds across many different contexts. It applies not
only to M&A agreements but also to sovereign debt,23 choice-of18 See, e.g., Hexion Specialty Chems., Inc. v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d 715, 721 (Del.
Ch. 2008).
19 See Sherwood v. Walker, 33 N.W. 919, 919 (Mich. 1887).
20 See Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
21 See Krell v. Henry [1903] 2 KB 740, 742.
22 See Victor P. Goldberg, Price Adjustment in Long-Term Contracts, 1985 WIS. L.
REV. 527, 536–37, 541.
23 See generally Robert E. Scott, Stephen J. Choi & Mitu Gulati, Anticipating
Venezuela’s Debt Crisis: Hidden Holdouts and the Problem of Pricing Collective Action
Clauses, 100 B.U. L. REV. 253 (2020); Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott,
Variation in Boilerplate: Rational Design or Random Mutation?, 20 AM. L. & ECON. REV.
1 (2018) [hereinafter Variation in Boilerplate]; Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Robert E.
Scott, The Black Hole Problem in Commercial Boilerplate, 67 DUKE L.J. 1 (2017) [hereinafter The Black Hole Problem]; Stephen J. Choi & Mitu Gulati, The Pricing of Non-price
Terms in Sovereign Bonds: The Case of the Greek Guarantees, 1 J.L. FIN. & ACCT. 1 (2016);
Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, The Dynamics of Contract Evolution, 88
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forum provisions,24 financings, and countless other contracts
where performance takes place far into an unknown future. In
each instance, the lion’s share of negotiation points is delegated
to lawyers. As these actors move from client to client (and contract
to contract), they function as important conduits through which
contracting conventions—and thus market practices—unfold and
evolve over time.
Yet this evolutionary process is rarely studied by scholars. To
be sure, the evolutionary behavior of prices is a familiar topic
among economists, who have developed elaborate theories to explain and predict such movements.25 And among legal scholars,
there is no shortage of attention paid to the evolution of legal doctrine for its interesting, if sometimes controversial, evolutionary
traits. But the tools of private ordering that precede, animate, and
actuate the structure of the myriad other (nonprice) terms within
contracts are generally not part of the discussion. And understanding the nature of contract innovation strikes at the heart of
contract law and policy.
At the same time, the academic literature on contract-term
evolution remains modest, fragmented, and highly context specific. Some have analogized contract terms to prices, arguing that
they evolve efficiently when exposed to market pressures and execution by rational parties.26 Others have countered that contracts simply do not have the same exposure to market dynamics,

N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2013) [hereinafter The Dynamics of Contract Evolution]; Stephen J. Choi,
Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, The Evolution of Contractual Terms in Sovereign Bonds, 4
J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 131 (2012) [hereinafter The Evolution of Contractual Terms in Sovereign Bonds]. See also Robert E. Scott, Stephen J. Choi & Mitu Gulati, Revising Boilerplate:
A Comparison of Private and Public Company Transactions, 2020 WIS. L. REV. 629, 630–
31 [hereinafter Revising Boilerplate].
24 See generally Julian Nyarko, Stickiness and Incomplete Contracts, 88 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1 (2021).
25 See generally, e.g., L ÉON W ALRAS , E LEMENTS OF T HEORETICAL E CONOMICS
(Donald A. Walker & Jan van Daal eds. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2014) (1874);
Gerard Debreu, Excess Demand Functions, 1 J. MATHEMATICAL ECON. 15 (1974); Wayne
Shafer & Hugo Sonnenschein, Market Demand and Excess Demand Functions, in 2
HANDBOOK OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS 671 (K.J. Arrow & M.D. Intriligator
eds., JP1982).
26 See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 559–61 (2003); Eric Talley, Discharging the Discharge for
Value Defense, 18 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 147, 153–54 (2021) (documenting the rapid rise of
“Revlon blocker” provisions after a dramatic federal court holding on mistaken payments).
This analogy assumes, of course, the same sorts of conditions that lead to pricing efficiency—i.e., that there are no distortions in the market, such as the abuses of market
power that antitrust law is meant to address.
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with some scholars advancing the thesis that evolutionary movements are virtually nonexistent, displaying a staunch rigidity
akin to a “black hole.”27 Yet others have used nearly the same observation about the lack of market discipline to argue in favor of
a “churning” effect, with rapid mutations that reflect incentives
of the drafters that stand in direct conflict with their clients’ interests.28 Some have even proposed that transactional lawyers
make unnecessary modifications simply to increase their billable
hours.29
But beyond these stylized accounts, we still have surprisingly
scant knowledge of the forces behind the evolution of contractual
terms. Can we predict when, whether, and how new “mutations”
to contract terms arrive and under what circumstances they will
make substantial incursions on contracting practices? What role
do lawyers play in this evolutionary process, either by promoting
the diffusion of a new term or by hindering it? And if lawyers do
play a role, do they create or destroy value in the process?
For several interrelated reasons, the answers to these questions are vitally important but thus far elusive: First, we still lack
a general theory about how contracts evolve over time and, in particular, how this process is intermediated by the actors who structure these terms. Second, empirical evidence for contractual evolution is often limited to isolated examples, preventing us from
testing or calibrating a more general theory. Having a broad understanding of contractual evolution is of particular importance
in today’s volatile environment, in which the economic, political,
and social milieus are undergoing significant and rapid change.
In this Article, we marshal both theoretical and empirical
tools to study contractual evolution.30 On the theoretical side, we
develop a general, holistic model of contract structuring in which
contract provisions are progressively embraced or abandoned by
27

The Black Hole Problem, supra note 23, at 3.
See generally Robert Anderson & Jeffrey Manns, The Inefficient Evolution of Merger Agreements, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 57 (2017).
29 Id. at 68.
30 Note that our focus is on negotiated commercial agreements and not contracts of
adhesion often used in the consumer context. See generally Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci &
Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Learning in Standard Form Contracts: Theory and Evidence
(N.Y.U. L. & Econ. Rsch. Paper Series Working Paper No. 18-11, 2018); Kevin E. Davis &
Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Contracting for Personal Data, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 662 (2019);
Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen, Does Anyone Read the Fine
Print? Consumer Attention to Standard Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2014);
Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & Robert Taylor, Set in Stone? Change and Innovation in Consumer Standard-Form Contracts, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 240 (2013).
28
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a community of lawyers acting sequentially. Many contracts with
significant economic stakes fall into this category, including financings, asset purchases, acquisitions, and licensing arrangements. Our model helps show how a variety of factors interact to
affect whether and under what circumstances a contractual mutation will be embraced by the industry. In particular, we show
that such diffusion is a function of several inputs, including information, experience, and lawyer networks. When lawyers are well
positioned to ascertain the value-creating attributes of a mutation, contracts can evolve quickly and efficiently to match changing environments. In other cases, legal actors need to gain experience with a new mutation over time—a constraint that can slow
its evolutionary trajectory and even cause some degree of mismatch. Throughout this process, the structure of lawyer networks
can play an important role, providing lawyers a conduit both to
transmit their experiences to one another and to sharpen their
individual expertise. Using simulations to analyze our model, we
generate several predictions about how mutations are likely to
manifest over time, what diffusion paths those mutations might
take, how desirable those paths are, and whether lawyers appear
to be adding value to the process.
In a second step, we export the intuitions acquired from our
simulations to the real world. Using a large dataset of over two
thousand M&A transactions that we collected and labeled by
hand, we track the evolution of a series of important contractual
innovations and the degree to which they are embraced or rejected by the networks of lawyers who structure them. 31 Our
analysis strongly suggests that not all contract terms are created
equal within our research design: we uncover evidence that the
distinct evolutionary paths identified by our model also play out
in actual market practice. Some terms clearly bear the markers
of well-informed lawyers tailoring their contracts to the clients

31 We made this data set—including the raw corpus from which the labels are generated—publicly available at CONTRACTUAL EVOLUTION, www.jennejohnnyarkotalley.com. These contractual terms include the following: pandemic-related force majeure
provisions discussed above; #MeToo (or “Weinstein”) provisions, in which a target company represents that no allegations of sexual harassment or misconduct have been made
against its senior executives; Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
(CFIUS) provisions, which allocate the risk of federal national security review; reverse
termination fees, which specify the amount that the buyer will pay to the target company
if the buyer terminates the deal for certain reasons; top-up options, which allow a bidder
to effect a short-form merger in situations where a tender offer does not result in the buyer
achieving an ownership interest over 90%; and choice-of-law and -forum provisions.
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that they represent. Others, however, demonstrate adoption patterns that seem unlikely to be highly bespoke. In addition, some
diffusion paths combine more than one pattern, such as when a
shock upends existing practices and spurs new innovation in the
market. M&A agreements do not follow a single evolutionary
path; they follow many.
Our analysis has important implications for law, policy, and
future research. Foremost, our analysis can help highlight when
and whether lawyers add significant value to deals. They also
help us understand the conditions under which legal-term innovation is most likely to occur in practice and whether such innovations are more likely to be temporary or durable contributions.
Our analysis may also shed light on how courts should interpret
such language—not only when it is included in a contract but also
when it is left out.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Part I provides an overview of the legal literature on contract-term evolution, showing that, at present, it largely consists of stylized canonical intuitions that talk past one another. Part II introduces
our own theory and model of contract evolution. It combines many
of the features of the existing arguments within a single framework. We then use simulations to show how different diffusion
patterns can arise under varying contractual environments, such
as under a highly concentrated or a dispersed market for the provision of legal services. Part III applies these insights to realworld data involving significant M&A agreements. We track the
adoption and diffusion of a variety of contract mutations over the
years, including pandemic-related force majeure clauses, #MeToo
provisions, and reverse termination fees. Our analysis confirms
that there is great heterogeneity in the diffusion paths of our example terms, and a one-size-fits-all, stylized account is likely not
appropriate. Part IV discusses a variety of implications of our
analysis for both contract theory and negotiation theory. A final
Part concludes. A technical appendix includes some of the formal
derivations of our modeling results for the technically minded
reader.
I. THEORIES OF CONTRACT EVOLUTION AND THEIR LIMITS
The innovation and diffusion of contracts is a topic that is
seldom discussed in traditional contract law. As law students
learn each year in their first-year contracts courses, a central (if
somewhat idealized) principle of Anglo-American contract law is
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that contract terms are thought to embody and reflect the intentions of the parties who negotiated them.32 Under this idealized
account, the terms of an agreement are mechanically customized
by the parties to channel their particular intent. Although certain
special types of written instruments, including mass-market consumer contracts, are a recognized exception to this account, it is
still common to think that major transactions comport with the
traditional narrative.
Consequently, it can seem misplaced to talk about the “innovation” of contract terms and the diffusion of new contractual language within large, significant, dickered transactions. After all,
to negotiate a contract is to breathe life into new terms, and thus
every contract is in some ways an innovation, with no necessary
tether to what came before.
For the same reasons, the idea of a “diffusion” of a new contract term also seems an odd fit within the standard paradigm.
While parties negotiating separate agreements may coincidentally employ similar contractual language as their predecessors, doing so hardly seems to describe a diffusion process. By definition, tailoring a contract to each deal implies that early
contracts should have little to no effect on successors. Viewed in
this sense, if two deals converged on similar (or identical) contractual terms, it would simply be an accident of fate—much like
when Newton and Leibniz each independently stumbled upon key
principles of calculus in the seventeenth century.33
Even for large, seemingly bespoke deals, however, the idea
that terms are rigorously reset de novo for each transaction
misses the mark. In settings where transactions with facially similar characteristics occur frequently, there are several potential
benefits to standardizing and emulating contractual language
from one deal to the next. First, reusing boilerplate language allows the designer to exploit economies of scale, like the Ford
Motor Company accomplished a century ago with the standardized design of the Model T.34 Not unlike an automobile, there can
be many moving parts in a large transactional instrument. And
for many of those parts, the benefits of customization may not
justify the costs.
32 See Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott, Contract Design and the Structure of Contractual Intent, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1023, 1025–26 (2009).
33 See D.B. MELI, EQUIVALENCE AND PRIORITY: NEWTON VERSUS LEIBNIZ: INCLUDING
LEIBNIZ’S UNPUBLISHED MANUSCRIPTS ON THE PRINCIPIA 7 (1993).
34 Barak Richman, Contracts Meet Henry Ford, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 77, 79–82 (2011).
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Second, standardized contractual language can lead to
greater certainty in interpretation if a dispute about the language
lands in front of a court or arbitrator. Judicial precedents are a
public good, and familiar terms are more likely to have accumulated meaning from previous interpretations. Courts have long
been cognizant of this externality of precedents, and they have
emphasized the importance of the uniformity and predictability
of boilerplate language—a benefit that is not lost on contracting
parties.35
Finally, the evolutionary path of contractual terms from deal
to deal may be a particularly good way for lawyers to learn from
each other and from their prior selves. A well-designed contract
provision is more likely to withstand the test of time, and its serial emulation may constitute a diagnostic signal of its quality.
By the same token, if a novel form of contractual language diffuses throughout a market, it can send an informational signal
along the way as lawyers incorporate it into their own deals. As
Paul Cravath put it rather floridly over a century ago, such terms
may reflect “the experience and prophetic vision of a great many
able lawyers.”36
Likewise, standardization will necessarily cause the language of a contract to diverge from specific intentions of the parties to the agreement.37 No longer completely tethered to the immediate circumstance, contractual language can take on a life of
its own, transcending the bargaining context of any given deal.
Over time, in fact, the widespread adoption of a boilerplate provision among participants in a market can lead to extreme outcomes. In cases where the term is deeply entrenched, the cost of
switching to a new and untested version of the term can become
prohibitive.38 And in such cases, contractual language becomes
highly path dependent, potentially undermining the market’s
ability to embrace good innovations while weeding out bad ones.

35 See, e.g., Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 691 F.2d 1039, 1048–
49 (2d Cir. 1982) (discussing the need for uniformity in interpreting boilerplate successorobligor clauses).
36 Paul D. Cravath, Reorganizations of Corporations, in SOME LEGAL PHASES OF
CORPORATE FINANCING, REORGANIZATION, AND REGULATION 153, 178 (1917).
37 See generally Robin Bradley Kar & Margaret Jane Radin, Pseudo-Contract and
Shared Meaning Analysis, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1135 (2019). See also Stephen J. Choi & G.
Mitu Gulati, Contract as Statute, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1129, 1168–69 (2006).
38 See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 727–29 (1997).
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What factors lead to path dependency in some situations but
rapid evolution and diffusion in others? The existing research on
that question has produced multiple explanations. Some view the
pace of contractual evolution as “too cold”—i.e., standardized
terms become frozen in time so that even momentous shocks in
the market struggle to stimulate a change in contractual language. Others posit that contract evolution is “too hot”—i.e.,
transactional lawyers constantly churn contractual language,
adding clauses here and tinkering with terms there, with little
purpose other than to increase the client’s bill. That said, the most
traditional story of contracting posits that contract evolution is
(approximately) efficient, yielding to the forces of market competition or effective organizational routines within law firms. In
that sense, it can be described as the “just right” account. We discuss each account in turn below.
A. “Too Cold”: When Contract Terms Become Frozen in Time
The greatest amount of recent scholarly attention has focused
on scenarios in which contractual innovation is inhibited. According to this theory, sophisticated companies and their lawyers
sometimes fail to improve on their contractual terms, leading to
inefficiency and, at times, catastrophe.39
One significant branch of this literature argues that the expectations of other participants in the market contribute to a contractual “lock-in.” Parties expect to see certain standardized
terms in a deal.40 One reason is familiarity: as a contract term
becomes more widely adopted, its value becomes more certain
(compared to the less certain value of idiosyncratic terms), particularly as courts, arbitrators, and other third-party actors interpret them over time.41 A related reason for lock-in is that deviations from standard, market terms may be viewed as a negative
signal of a party’s quality. In many transactions, information
about a party’s ability and inclination to fully perform its contractual obligations is not easily observed. If a party proposes a novel
39 See MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE 3 1/2 MINUTE TRANSACTION:
BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT DESIGN 3–4 (2013).
40 Standardized terms become more useful as their adoption within a market
grows—a phenomenon familiar to many technologies, such as operating systems or hardware interfaces. See Douglas Gale, Standard Securities, 59 REV. ECON. STUD. 731, 735–39
(1992) (analyzing coordination failures in securities contracts); Kahan & Klausner, supra
note 38, at 730.
41 See Gale, supra note 40, at 734–35 (identifying an “unfamiliarity premium” for
unfamiliar securities).
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formation of a standard contractual term during negotiations,
their counterparts may become suspicious that the nonstandard
proposal is indicative of an undisclosed (and therefore likely negative) hazard.42 As a result, parties will stick to standard terms to
avoid giving the impression that they pose a heightened risk for
breach.
To combat contractual lock-ins, innovation sometimes requires concerted action in the market. In a game-theoretic sense,
market participants’ choice to abandon a standard term for a new
formulation is a type of coordination problem.43 And a central feature of coordination games is the notion of strategic complementarity—i.e., one player’s incentive to take a certain strategy increases as others take that same strategy.44 For agents to find it
in their interests to pursue the new strategy, they must be convinced of widespread agreement over the change, either explicit
or tacit, among other participants in the market—here, an agreement to shift from an old standard term to a new one. As the size
of the market grows, the costs of such coordination increase, and
shifting the market to a new equilibrium may be prohibitively
costly without facilitation from a formal institution, such as a
trade association.45
42

See id.
See generally THOMAS SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR (1978).
See also THOMAS SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 89–92 (2d ed. 1980).
44 See Gale, supra note 40, at 749–50.
45 Empirical research has identified two major coordination patterns. The first pattern—a gradual adjustment to a new equilibrium after an external shock—has been observed in multiple studies of the sovereign-debt market, where a large number of bondholders participate in the market (and coordination costs are therefore high). The external
shock in these studies is typically a novel judicial interpretation of an old boilerplate provision, which demonstrates to market participants the need for a new and improved term.
These studies find that, despite how obvious the need for a new term may be, the market
is reluctant for months or even years to adopt a new formulation, with adoption only gaining steam once a coordinating event—such as intervention by a major institution (e.g., a
trade association)—occurs. See The Black Hole Problem, supra note 23, at 38–40 (discussing the role that a set of meetings among major market participants which played in coordinating the shift to a new contractual standard); The Dynamics of Contract Evolution,
supra note 23, at 23–24 (discussing the role of the International Monetary Fund in coordinating the shift to a new contractual standard); The Evolution of Contractual Terms in
Sovereign Bonds, supra note 23, at 162; Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Innovation in
Boilerplate Contracts: An Empirical Examination of Sovereign Bonds Conference on Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 929, 935–36 (2004).
That gradual model of contract innovation differs from the swifter—or “light switch”—
model of change observed when coordination costs are relatively low. For instance, a study
found that after a simultaneous shock to both the corporate-bond market and the acquisition market for privately held companies, the adoption of a new contract term began almost immediately in the privately held company-acquisition market, where participation
43
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A second branch of the lock-in literature focuses on internal
dynamics within law firms as a source of contractual path dependency. Whereas the literature discussed above emphasizes
the network effects that arise due to interdependence among participants in a market, this substrand of research emphasizes
what might be considered the contractual “production process”
within law firms. This work argues that the way in which contracts are designed can matter for innovation as much as network
effects.
Research focusing on the production process tends to highlight how practices and routines that lawyers use in contract design interfere with innovation. It begins with an observation that
appears mundane at first glance: transactional lawyers often use
precedent documents and model agreements when designing
their agreements. Those templates may be from prior deals that
the law firm has done or may be publicly available agreements by
other firms that are readily available on databases like the
Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) EDGAR database
of public filings. Deal lawyers may use portions of those precedent
agreements wholesale—contract design by copy and paste.46 Or
they may use precedent as a starting point, tweaking it in subsequent iterations.
The reason for reusing boilerplate may reflect risk aversion.
Particularly in bargains with high stakes, a lawyer may not wish
to venture into uncharted territory by including a new contractual formulation that, while arguably superior to precedent, increases their exposure to blame if a problem between the contracting parties later arises.47
The end result is, once again, that established terms can become frozen in time. Not only are contract terms in stasis, however. The meaning of the language can also degrade as lawyers
reuse it without reflection from one deal to the next. A contract
term may appear in an agreement, but what it actually means
has been lost to memory.48 Devoid of real intent, the term functionally becomes a “contractual black hole.”49
is concentrated and coordination costs are therefore low. In comparison, change in corporate bonds was much more gradual. See Revising Boilerplate, supra note 23, at 647–53.
46 See generally Claire A. Hill, Repetition, Ritual, and Reputation: How Do Market
Participants Deal with (Some Types of) Incomplete Information?, 2020 WIS. L. REV. 515.
47 See GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 39, at 149.
48 See Variation in Boilerplate, supra note 23, at 3–4; GULATI & SCOTT, supra
note 39, at 140–41.
49 See generally The Black Hole Problem, supra note 23.
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B. “Too Hot”: Self-Interested Lawyers Overwork Contractual
Language
In stark contrast to the literature highlighting contractual
stasis, the rote usage of contract terms may also invite the opposite dynamic. Indeed, some scholars have advanced the argument
that contractual language is sometimes too quick to change—
even when those changes do not further the clients’ interest. Under this accounting, contractual innovation is “too hot.”
One formulation of this reasoning focuses on product differentiation. Particularly in new and evolving fields and applications, transactional attorneys may be in a competition to set the
standard for deals on the horizon. Under this approach, clients
may be particularly attracted to those lawyers who they perceive
to be setting the standard, assuming them to have greater expertise and experience in an area. Anticipating this reaction, of
course, law firms may be incentivized to change the contractual
language as a means of signaling their expertise to the market.
In these scenarios, firms may introduce trivial alterations to wellestablished terms in an attempt to differentiate their legal offerings. Such strategic tailoring may represent churning a contract
by making immaterial adjustments.50
Product differentiation of this sort leads to a pattern of contract evolution different from the models emphasizing path dependence discussed above. Deliberately altering yesterday’s deal
terms on the margins leads to an increase in diversity in the market. For instance, Professors Robert Anderson and Jeffrey Manns
depict developments in contract terms as “phylogenetic trees”
that reveal how the incremental changes result in “drift” over
time.51
C. “Just Right”: Incremental Contractual Innovation Is
Achieved
The third, and perhaps most traditional, line of argument
identifies circumstances where contract evolution proceeds at a
pace that is “just right” on average, evolving to best fit the exigen-

50
51

See Anderson & Manns, supra note 28, at 68, 88–89.
Id. at 77–78.
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cies at the time. Not only does this account comport with the neoclassical-economics view of contracting,52 but it also aptly describes a long and pedigreed account of corporate law in general.53
In the context of M&A transactions, there appears to be further
support for this theory. For example, Professor John Coates IV
found evidence that M&A agreements are neither fully customized to each deal nor completely boilerplate, instead exhibiting a
type of “constrained variation.”54
What drives certain contracts to fall within this intermediate
category rather than one of the two extremes is not entirely obvious, although it can be hypothesized that the interests of the clients are incorporated by the transactional lawyers to at least
some extent. A steady cadence of efficient contractual innovation
may be achieved because clients screen for quality in their attorneys, and quality requires a lawyer to internalize the clients’ interests. Similarly, law firms may develop internal organizational
routines and incentives that effectively support client-driven innovation rather than encouraging deal teams to rely too much on
internal boilerplate templates.55 Alternatively, industry trade associations may be particularly effective in reducing the coordination costs that impede contractual innovation. Professor Lisa
Bernstein’s classic studies of how industry associations in a variety of commodity industries regularly update standardized form
contracts provide one such example.56
Under any of these accounts, one might expect contract terms
to evolve in an efficient direction on average—in some cases arriving there very quickly. Such a dynamic is also most consistent
with efficiency considerations, suggesting that any evident lockin might simply be an optimal gravitation to a provision that is
categorically value enhancing.
52

See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 1–39 (1991).
54 John C. Coates IV, M&A Contracts: Purposes, Types, Regulation, and Patterns of
Practice, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 29, 35–38 (Claire A.
Hill & Stephen Davidoff Solomon eds., 2016); see also Matthew Jennejohn, Transformation
Cost Engineering, 2020 WIS. L. REV. 573, 586–93 (providing empirical evidence that the
standardization of different terms differs across different categories of M&A contracts).
55 See Matthew Jennejohn, The Architecture of Contract Innovation, 59 B.C. L. REV.
71, 94–95 (2018).
56 See generally, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry:
Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724
(2001); Richard A. Epstein, Confusion About Custom: Disentangling Informal Customs
from Standard Contractual Provisions, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 821 (1999).
53
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D. The Limits of Prior Research
While the research reviewed above significantly enriches our
theory of how contracts are designed, it also raises several vexing
questions. Conventional contract theory teaches us that the design of an agreement turns on the unique bargaining dynamics
between negotiating parties—a setting that may itself change
over time. Yet each of the various accounts above suppresses the
mechanics of how, precisely, this dynamic process unfolds. Contract provisions may become resistant to change due to thirdparty expectations within a market, shortfalls of expertise among
advisers, asymmetric flows of information in a market, lawyers’
dysfunctional drafting practices, or slack between lawyers and
the clients who pay them to design their agreements. In each case,
the emergence of boilerplate terms seems to emphasize that contracts are not expressly bargained for; rather, they are the result
of a production process, with bargaining dynamics sitting offstage. This is the opposite of contractual economics’ message.
Setting this issue aside, there remain important limitations
that prior research has not yet overcome. First, although prior
research gives us a punch list of possible factors that may inhibit
contractual innovation, it provides little direction on how to combine these factors into a coherent theory that explains how they
interact or when one factor is more influential than others.
Relatedly, many commercial agreements are complex, including dozens or even hundreds of terms, but scholarship tends to
study terms in isolation.57 This obscures the possibility that factors contributing to path dependency affect agreements asymmetrically, with some terms standardized and others customized.
This middle-ground category of agreements is found in important
markets, such as the market for corporate control. M&A agreements are neither fully customized to each deal nor completely
boilerplate, instead exhibiting “constrained variation.”58
Finally, prior studies typically build conceptual models of
contract innovation that are specific to certain markets rather

57 See generally, e.g., Jeffrey T. Macher & Barak D. Richman, Transaction Cost Economics: An Assessment of Empirical Research in the Social Sciences, 10 BUS. & POL. 1
(2008); Cathy Hwang & Matthew Jennejohn, The New Research on Contractual Complexity, 14 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 381 (2019). But see generally The Dynamics of Contract Evolution,
supra note 23; The Evolution of Contractual Terms in Sovereign Bonds, supra note 23.
58 See Coates, supra note 54, at 6; Jennejohn, supra note 54, at 581 (providing empirical evidence that the standardization of different terms differs across different categories of M&A contracts).
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than constructing generalizable models that can be deployed
across a variety of exchange environments. Gaining meaningful
traction in this area going forward will require scholars to stitch
together these stylized examples into a unified theory.59
This Article takes an important step toward addressing those
gaps in the literature. It provides a general model of contract evolution that combines multiple constraints on innovation, captures
dynamics across a variety of agreement types and terms, and applies to any number of markets. The next Part turns to this task
in earnest, informally introducing the basic moving parts of our
model.
II. A GENERAL MODEL OF CONTRACTUAL EVOLUTION
In order to generate intuitions about when, why, and how
contract terms change over time, this Part develops a formal
model of contract-term evolution. To frame our discussion, we will
employ a canonical, timely example pertaining to the adoption of
a pandemic-related exclusion in an M&A deal, much like the
Tiffany–LVMH dispute discussed above. Nevertheless, as discussed in the Introduction, the framework that we present below
is quite general, and it advances a mechanism for contract-term
evolution that could plausibly apply to any contractual scenario
where legal actors play a pivotal role in contract design.
Before proceeding, we pause briefly to note that our methodological approach uses a formal model to generate several intuitions. Our purpose in undertaking this approach is motivated, in
some measure, by our observation above that the legal scholarship still lacks a unified theory of contract-term evolution. Part of
that disunity stems from the absence of a single framework
within which to evaluate such evolution. This is where formal
models can provide great utility.
To be sure, formal models frequently attract criticism because they are said to be unrealistic, as they do not capture the
complexity of real-world scenarios. While this criticism has some
merit, it is important to understand that any model is—by definition—a deliberate abstraction and is therefore unrealistic by design. But that is also the point: a virtue of models is that they
59 There are some exceptions to this rule. One of us, for example, has analyzed how
choice-of-forum provisions across hundreds of thousands of agreements can exhibit important cross-industry trends. See generally Nyarko, supra note 24 (analyzing choice-offorum provisions in a sample of half a million agreements spanning a number of
industries).
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focus on a limited set of core phenomena of interest, isolating
them from factors that are either unrelated or less pertinent to
the inquiry at hand.60 Doing so often reveals intuitions that would
otherwise be harder to discern and understand. In turn, those intuitions can be assessed against real-world data (which we proceed to do in Part III).
That said, we do not aspire to develop a formal model that is
prohibitively difficult to understand—that would defeat the purpose of developing clean intuitions. Consequently, this Part presents our modeling approach and core results informally, using
numerical examples where appropriate. Readers interested in a
more technical characterization of the model that makes use of
formal notation can find it in the Appendix.
A. The Setting
Consider a transactional setting that involves a sequence of
buyer-seller pairs, each negotiating terms governing an acquisition agreement. For concreteness, suppose that exactly one contract is negotiated each day, and neither the buyer nor the seller
contracts repeatedly. For each such transaction, the buyer and
seller each retain sophisticated law firms to represent their interests, delegating to it the task of negotiating many of the transactional details other than price. Unlike their clients, these law
firms are repeat players. To illustrate using the example of the
Tiffany-LVMH merger, among the details negotiated by the law
firms is an MAE provision, which determines whether and under
what circumstances the buyer can walk away from the deal in the
face of changed circumstances. Below is a stylized example of a
typical MAE clause:
“Company Material Adverse Effect” means any effect,
change, event, circumstance, or occurrence that has had or
would reasonably be expected to have a material adverse effect on the seller’s business, operations, or financial condition; provided, however, that none of the following shall be
taken into account in determining whether a Company Material Adverse Effect has occurred or may occur: (A) any occurrence, condition, change, event or effect resulting from or
relating to changes in general economic or financial market
60 For more on this point, see Eric Talley, Turning Servile Opportunities to Gold: A
Strategic Account of the Corporate Opportunities Doctrine, 108 YALE L.J. 277,
310–11 (1998).
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conditions; (B) any occurrence, condition, change, event or effect that affects the targets industry as a whole.
This provision is structured in such a way that many—but
not all—of the important risks associated with changed circumstances are assigned to the seller. In particular, the buyer is allowed to walk away from the deal when there is a significant negative impact on the seller’s business, operations, or financial
condition. However, the provision also excludes certain types of
changed circumstances that do not count as an MAE, meaning
that such risks are effectively borne by the buyer. In our example,
the buyer is not allowed to walk away from the deal if the effect
also impairs the whole economy or peer firms in the industry.
These latter exclusions are popularly known as “MAE carveouts.”
To add some color, suppose that the first transaction in this
sequence is negotiated in January 2020, just as news of the
COVID-19 virus was beginning to spread.61 Cognizant of the nascent risk, counsel for the seller deliberates whether to propose a
deviation from the standard MAE, inserting “pandemics” as an
explicit MAE carveout. From the counsel’s perspective, doing so
would provide considerable benefits: it maximizes the probability
that the deal closes, and it assigns all the risk of a pandemic to
the buyer. At the same time, however, an explicit pandemic carveout will come at a cost. First, it calls attention to the emergent
hazard, which would be significant if the buyer’s counsel were not
already aware of the risk. Second, counsel for the buyer would
likely be unwilling to accept a pandemic carveout without extracting a buyer-friendly provision as a quid pro quo.62 Third, enumerating “pandemic” as an MAE carveout could have unintended consequences as to other unanticipated changes. If, say, some
distinct disaster eventuates (e.g., an asteroid hitting Earth), the
fact that this MAE has chosen explicitly to carve out pandemics
while remaining silent on everything else may lead courts to conclude that all nonpandemic risks were intentionally excluded and

61 See, e.g., Derrick Bryson Taylor, A Timeline of the Coronavirus Pandemic, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 17, 2021), https://perma.cc/7QK8-T3WJ.
62 See Albert Choi & George Triantis, The Effect of Bargaining Power on Contract
Design, 98 VA. L. REV. 1665, 1690–91 (2012) (describing a two-stage negotiation process
in which nonprice terms are negotiated after the price terms are fixed); Jeffrey Manns &
Robert Anderson IV, The Merger Agreement Myth, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1143, 1176 (2012)
(describing that nonprice terms typically cannot be traded off against price terms).
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should be treated differently.63 By including an explicit pandemic
carveout, then, seller’s counsel might unwittingly amplify the
likelihood that a court will assign other, unenumerated risks to
the seller (e.g., terrorism). Given all these uncertainties, the
seller’s counsel may have difficulty determining the precise value
of the pandemic carveout. Counsel for the buyer may be in a similar position—unsure of the magnitude of the underlying risk but
possibly receptive to a pandemic exclusion if they could extract a
sufficiently valuable concession in return.
B. Sequence of the Model and Informational Environment
Against this backdrop, our model envisions that a new contract term or mutation (e.g., a pandemic carveout) might require
several distinct transactions to emerge. And it is here that lawyers begin to play an important role. As noted above, in each
transaction a new buyer-seller pair seeks to conclude an agreement, each retaining one law firm chosen at random from a fixed
population of multiple firms.64 Once selected, the two firms negotiate over whether to retain the traditional term or to adopt the
new, explicit carveout provision. Several considerations influence
their final decision, including their general beliefs, the knowledge
and experience that they have gained from prior deals, and their
(possibly imprecise) impressions of the economics of the deal in
front of them. We will detail these considerations below.
1. Composition of population.
Our model assumes that adopting the mutation is not ideal
for all possible contracts. In particular, we suppose that there is
a percentage of deals—denoted by 𝑧—for which a pandemic carveout would represent a net cost, effectively destroying value. Such
scenarios could, for example, represent a transaction where the
buyer is a superior risk bearer or where uncertainty about judicial
interpretation of the term is prohibitive. For the remaining percentage of deals—(100% − 𝑧)—the new mutation would create
value. Such a situation might describe scenarios in which the

63

This interpretive canon, known as ejusdem generis, states that when there is an
enumerated list of examples, such lists should be read to limit the reach of more general
terms. Ejusdem Generis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
64 In our baseline simulations, we will arbitrarily set the number of law firms to ten
for expositional purposes. Our model allows the number of law firms to be set at any positive, nonzero integer.
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seller is the superior risk bearer or the uncertainties about legal
interpretation are low. Significantly, however, we further assume
that this key proportion 𝑧 is itself not known with certainty but
could take on one of two profiles. For example, either (a) the population tends to favor the conventional term, such that 𝑧 = 70%
(and 100% − 𝑧 = 30%); or (b) it tends to favor the mutation with
𝑧 = 30% (and 100% − 𝑧 = 70%). Regardless of which direction the
population skews, it is clear that the mutation does not yield a
uniformly positive payoff across all deals.
2. Baseline belief about composition of population.
Importantly, our model assumes that the population skew is
not itself directly observable by the negotiating lawyers. In other
words, lawyers do not know for certain whether the population of
deals, on balance, benefits from the new mutation or not. Facing
such uncertainty, the first (and most logical) starting point for
them is their underlying prior belief about the population’s characteristics. Because our core interest is to trace the evolution of
contractual provisions in unfamiliar environments, we presume
that attorneys begin with considerable confidence that the mutation is not valuable on average. Instead, they (incorrectly) believe
that 70% of deals should not adopt the mutation and should instead incorporate the conventional term. In our baseline analysis,
we assume that attorneys are 95% confident of this fact and that
they assess only a 5% likelihood that the overall population of
deals favors the mutation. Combining these facts, it follows that
the parties’ prior belief that a randomly selected deal is amenable
to the mutation is only 32%.65
3. Signal of the deal.
In addition to general attributes of the population, we further
assume that each new deal brings with it its own information that
assists the parties in determining whether the mutation is likely
to generate value. For instance, as noted above, the buyer and
seller themselves may be able to assess to a certain degree which
party is better able to bear risk, and the pricing formulas of each
deal (e.g., cash versus stock) may further suggest who the most
efficient risk bearer is. The parties likely also have specific information about how susceptible their other operations are to events

65

0.95 × 30% + 0.05 × 70% = 32%.

924

The University of Chicago Law Review

[89:4

like pandemics that have widespread impacts on the economy. To
the extent that they have access to and can accurately process
such information, transactional lawyers would want to incorporate it in deciding whether to adopt the mutation.
That said, the lawyers are a step removed from both the internal operations of their clients and other factors that might affect the overall value of each mutation. As a result, their dealspecific knowledge may itself be somewhat limited and not always
reliable. Our model accounts for this possibility, too, by presuming that lawyers have access to a noisy “signal” of whether the
specific deal before them is best adapted to the mutation. The accuracy of this signal will prove important to the lawyers’ subsequent actions.
To take one extreme example, suppose lawyers are particularly perceptive and can identify with 100% accuracy whether a
deal they are negotiating is better suited for the conventional
term or a new term. Here, we would not expect that other information pertaining to the population-wide distribution of deals
would have any consequence. The lawyers would craft the deal in
the way that is best suited to the deal in front of them. On the
other end of the spectrum, suppose that the deal signal is wholly
uninformative—right and wrong with equal likelihood. Here, the
signal would be useless, and the parties would lean exclusively on
their beliefs about what is best for the average deal in the population of all contracts.
The most realistic scenario, however, falls between those two
extremes, where the signal is neither perfect nor useless. The parties, therefore, can combine it with their preexisting beliefs about
the entire population of deals in order to inform their actions for
the deal in front of them. As we show below, this possibility gives
rise to an interesting learning dynamic in which the lawyers may
be guided sometimes by their knowledge about the population
and other times by their deal-specific information (and this proclivity might change over time).
4. Prior experience.
Finally, and perhaps most centrally, our model allows the
transacting attorneys to engage in a form of dynamic learning
through prior dealmaking. Lawyers are, after all, the pivotal repeat players in this context, and they can be expected to gain additional information about the effects and appropriateness of the
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mutation as time passes. Over time, as lawyers continue to negotiate deals, they begin to amass a collection of prior signals that
they observed in past transactions. That information, in turn, can
buttress their knowledge and expectations as to whether, on average, it is more likely that a given mutation increases or decreases contractual surplus.
In our illustrative example, the lawyers may, over time, observe that deals incorporating a pandemic carveout appear with
surprising frequency. While they perhaps would have resisted the
new term for the first few deals, the increasing frequency of seemingly well-adapted deals can cause them to update their beliefs
about how many deals benefit from the new term.
Given the incremental learning possibilities, our model also
allows the amassed knowledge of both parties’ lawyers to inform
their transaction collaboratively. Here, we assume that lawyers
can draw on their past experiences—in particular, signals that
they have observed from prior deals—to update their beliefs regarding the prevalence of mutation-favored deals in the population. Specifically, we suppose that the lawyers negotiating each
deal are able to pool their observations from prior deals to further
refine, through Bayesian updating, their assessment of the overall population.66 This assessment is then combined with the signal
that they observe in the instant deal, and the parties will favor
the mutation if and only if they believe that the deal in front of
them is at least 50% likely to warrant the mutation.
C. Model Simulations
Having laid out the basic elements of our model, we are now
in a position to demonstrate some of the ways that it may propa-

66 See Eric L. Talley, Law, Economics, and the Burden(s) of Proof, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF TORTS 305, 308 n.9 (Jennifer H. Arlen ed., 2013):

The term “Bayesian” refers to the process by which a statistically-minded
decision-maker marshals available information to update her probabilistic beliefs about the world. . . . The benchmark process of updating follows what is
known as “Bayes’s rule,” which states (for the case of discrete random variables)
that the probability of an event A occurring, conditional on knowing that some
other event B has occurred (or Pr[A|B]) can be derived from a combination of
the respective “base rate” probabilities of A and B (or Pr[A] and Pr[B]) and the
“reverse conditional” probability that B occurs, conditional on knowing that A
has occurred (or Pr[B|A]). These four probabilities are related to one another
according to the following expression:
Pr[B|A]×Pr[A]
Pr[A|B] =
.
Pr[B]
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gate an assortment of diffusion patterns. We begin by briefly illustrating and discussing the roles of several of our parameters
on the diffusion pattern. We believe that this exercise yields intuitive yet important insights into how mutations might diffuse in
practice. In a second step, we will consider special cases of diffusion patterns.
Table 1 describes the core elements of our model, both in
plain English (column 2) and in terms of mathematical parameters (column 3). When a parameter is involved, we also specify the
value that we assign to it in our baseline analysis (column 4). For
instance, the first row in Table 1 suggests that we denote the
number of law firms with the symbol 𝑁 and that we set it to ten.
This means that, in our baseline model, the parties choose from a
pool of ten law firms.
To develop intuitions about the diffusion paths, we use the
parameter values from Table 1 to simulate a series of two thousand sequential deals (“rounds”), each of which follows the process described above. Because each simulation sequence evolves
probabilistically, it need not always follow the same path when
simulated multiple times. We therefore repeatedly run the twothousand-round simulations in order to assess the average
tendencies of the diffusion paths over time. In all the simulation
diagrams below, we have rerun (iterated) the simulation one hundred separate times.
TABLE 1: KEY PARAMETERS FOR TERM EVOLUTION SIMULATIONS
(BENCHMARK CASE)
Step
Description
1 A one-shot buyer and a
one-shot seller choose
their counsel from a pool
of repeat-play law firms
2 The lawyers negotiate
the adoption of either a
conventional term or a
mutation. A fraction of
all deals favors the conventional term and the
remainder favor the mutation

Parameter
Number of Law
firms = 𝑁

Fraction of deals
favoring the
conventional
term = 𝑧;
Proportion favoring the mutation = 1 − 𝑧

Benchmark Value
𝑁 = 10

𝑧 = 0.3 (or 30%)
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The lawyers share prior
beliefs that the population is, on balance, best
adapted to the mutation
The lawyers assess
whether the specific deal
in front of them is best
adapted to the mutation
or the conventional term
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Prior beliefs = 𝑟0

𝑟0 = 0.05 (or 5%)

Accuracy of the
inference by the
lawyers = γ

γ = 0.6 (or 60%)

1. The benchmark case.
As described above, our benchmark model fixes the various
parameter values at 𝑧 = 0.3, 𝑟0 = 0.05, γ = 0.6. This set of baseline
parameters is tantamount to assuming that the adoption of the
mutation is value enhancing in 70% of deals but that law firms
have a strong prior belief that the mutation is, on balance, value
decreasing.
As can be seen in Figure 1, lawyers are initially hesitant to
adopt the mutation term. But over time, they build experience
and begin to adopt the mutation, although the rate of adoption is
gradual. As time progresses, the adoption rate converges to 100%,
and the mutation displaces the conventional term to become dominant.
FIGURE 1: BENCHMARK SIMULATIONS

It is worth noting from this benchmark simulation that the
mutation is not simply successful in diffusing the market, but it
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is too successful in some ways. Although the majority of deals
(70%) are well adapted to the mutation, it visits a loss for 30% of
them. In this sense, the collective embrace of the mutation overshoots the first-best rate of 70% adoption. The reason for this
overshooting is simple: in our baseline simulations, lawyers are
not particularly skilled at discerning deal-specific information;
the signal that they observe is only 60% accurate, meaning that
they have only modest confidence in their ability to diagnose the
specific deal in front of them. In an environment of such contractspecific uncertainty, lawyers eventually lean more on their population-wide knowledge, embracing an imperfect, one-size-fits-all
approach. Since prior experience suggests that the mutation has
been, on average, value enhancing in the past, law firms ultimately opt to adopt it in all of their deals.
2. The strength of the prior belief (𝑟0 ).
Another key factor in the diffusion path is what belief the
lawyers initially held. In our benchmark case, we assume that
they start out believing strongly (but incorrectly) that the mutation is, on average, value decreasing. It is only over time that they
amend those beliefs. In Figure 2, we consider two alternatives. In
the first, we fix 𝑟0 = 40%, so that the lawyers only have a weak
belief that the mutation is value decreasing. In the second, we fix
𝑟0 = 95%, corresponding to a strong belief that the adoption is
value increasing.
Clearly, prior beliefs strongly influence the diffusion pattern.
If prior beliefs are weak (𝑟0 = 40%, per the left panel), lawyers
will be less inclined to stick with the conventional term and
quicker to adopt the new mutation relative to the benchmark
case. Although this point might seem intuitive, we believe that it
is still an important finding. After all, out in the real world, law
firms can vary dramatically in expertise. Law firms that are relatively less comfortable in assessing a legal field likely have
weaker priors and would thus be more likely to embrace a new
mutation. In contrast, specialists (e.g., boutique firms) may have
particularly strong priors. Our model suggests that these strong
priors can also come with a decreased willingness to adopt contractual innovations.
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FIGURE 2: ALTERNATIVE PRIOR BELIEFS

When lawyers’ prior beliefs more closely correspond to the
“ground truth” that the mutation is value enhancing on average
(𝑟0 = 95%, per the right panel), the convergence is nearly automatic: they will initially adopt the term immediately and generally continue on that path.
3. The number of law firms (𝑁).
Another key factor in understanding diffusion paths is the
size of the law-firm market. In our benchmark simulations, we
assumed that the parties randomly choose from 𝑁 = 10 law firms.
We vary this assumption in Figure 3, where we consider the alternative cases of a small market (𝑁 = 3, left panel) and a large
market (𝑁 = 100, right panel).
FIGURE 3: ALTERING THE NUMBER OF LAW FIRMS

As is clear from Figure 3, smaller markets lead to faster
adoption, while larger markets dampen diffusion. The reason is
very much tied to the key attribute of learning in our diffusion
model—prior experience. Varying the number of law firms implicitly adjusts the frequency with which each individual law firm is
able to gain experience. For instance, in the left panel (𝑁 = 3),
each law firm will, on average, negotiate one of every three deals.
This allows the lawyers to quickly accumulate experience with
the specific type of deal in front of them. Because experience plays
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a significant role in the learning process, accumulating more experience allows the firms to more quickly learn that the mutation
is value enhancing. In contrast, with (𝑁 = 100), each law firm
will, on average, negotiate only one in one hundred deals, making
it difficult to accumulate significant experience.
We believe that this insight has important implications in
practice. It suggests that adoption of a mutation can occur at a
much greater pace in highly concentrated industries where legal
services are provided by a handful of firms than in cases where
the provision of legal services is highly dispersed. A corollary to
this proposition is that large law firms attracting a lot of business
can obtain a competitive advantage in their drafting practices. Indeed, it has often been asked whether large law firms provide any
distinct economic value to their clients that cannot be obtained
equally by other, smaller players. A study by Professor Elisabeth
de Fontenay points out that one advantage of hiring such firms
could be their accumulated expertise and precision in pricing
deals.67 Our findings formalize and add to those of de Fontenay.
In particular, we show formally that, through repeat interaction,
large firms may be better positioned to identify promising mutations in contractual language and to differentiate between those
that increase the surplus for their clients and those that decrease
the surplus. We highlight, however, that this effect could be counteracted if large firms hold particularly strong and incorrect beliefs about the value proposition of a mutation.
4. The accuracy of the signal (γ).
Another determinant of diffusion paths is the expertise of the
lawyer, proxied by the precision of attorneys’ signals about the
deal in front of them. Our baseline model assumed that the signal
received from each deal, while more accurate than not, is relatively noisy (γ = 60%). In Figure 4, we examine several alternatives. First (upper left panel), we adjust this precision upward to
γ = 65%, which assumes that the signal is slightly more accurate
than the benchmark. We then set γ = 95%, which assumes that
the signal is highly accurate (upper right panel). In a last step,
we consider the special case of γ = 50%, which suggests that the
signal is essentially random noise and that nothing can be

67 See Elisabeth de Fontenay, Law Firm Selection and the Value of Transactional
Lawyering, 41 J. CORP. L. 393, 396 (2015).
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learned from the signals observed in current or prior deals (lower
panel).
FIGURE 4: ALTERING THE SIGNAL’S PRECISION

Note that a slight increase in signal precision (upper left
panel) enhances the pace at which the mutation is adopted. We
believe that this is intuitive. As the signal becomes more accurate,
parties can learn about the population more quickly. That said,
the pattern when signal precision is very high (upper right panel)
looks markedly different. Rather than converging to an adoption
rate of 100%, the adoption rate is close to the first-best efficient
adoption rate of 70%. To understand this result, recall that a high
signal precision means that the lawyers have very good information about the deal in front of them.68 Here, the signal from the
deal is accurate enough to make obsolete any population-wide information that the parties have, no matter how accurate. When,
in contrast, the signal’s precision stays below the overall population proportions (such as 65%), the signal is not as diagnostic as
good information about the overall population ratio (here, 70%).
Consequently, the latter information eventually controls the
adoption decision.
Finally, for completely uninformative signals (bottom panel),
no learning is possible. Here, the mean adoption rate is a flat line
68 The mean adoption rate is not exactly at the efficient level of 70%; it is slightly
below it. This is because lawyers still have a strong prior that the mutation is value
decreasing.
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at zero, indicating that law firms do not even experiment with
adopting the mutation. This makes intuitive sense, since the signal is random noise in this scenario. With nothing to learn from
current or prior signals, lawyers in each round tether their decisions to their prior beliefs about the population.
5. Special cases.
In addition to changing the parameters of our benchmark
simulations, we also analyze diffusion patterns under the assumption that there are several shocks to the transactional environment and ask how the adoption patterns change after the
shock. Although several such shocks are conceivable, we concentrate on two: regime shocks and information shocks.
a) Regime shocks. A regime shock refers to a scenario in
which there is a sudden, population-wide shift in a mutation’s net
costs and benefits. In our example, such a shock may take the
form of a sudden arrival of vaccines or herd immunity, which alter
the value of including a pandemic exclusion in the contract.69 Alternatively, a regime shock might result from a new judicial decision or other source of law that establishes how a mutation is interpreted by courts.70
Figure 5 depicts two different types of regime shocks. In the
first (left) panel, we introduce a shock in the one-thousandth
round that changes the proportion of deals favoring the conventional term 𝑧 from 30% to 70%. We assume that parties slowly
update their beliefs, which is a finding consistent with observations in the literature on how contractual parties sometimes react
69

Another particularly visible example (and one that we study empirically below)
pertains to so-called Weinstein or #MeToo representations in M&A deals. Through these
provisions, sellers guarantee that, to their knowledge, key employees are not involved in
any litigation or investigation alleging sexual misconduct or abuse. See Grace Maral
Burnett, #MeToo Reps Becoming M&A Market Standard, BLOOMBERG L. (June 25, 2019),
https://perma.cc/8JNM-E67T. While it was traditionally assumed that #MeToo representations were largely unimportant, the sexual-abuse scandal surrounding Harvey
Weinstein drastically increased the negative consequences for a company to be subject to
such litigation. As such, the number of deals for which a #MeToo representation could be
value enhancing increased dramatically and suddenly.
70 For instance, whereas parties under the “doing business” test traditionally enjoyed
relatively great flexibility in choosing their preferred litigation forum, a series of Supreme
Court decisions starting in 2011 introduced the “essentially at home test” under which a
company could be sued only in their principal place of business or their state of incorporation. See generally Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011);
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014). Arguably, this shock increased the value of
choice-of-forum provisions, in turn altering the underlying proportion of contracts for
which the adoption of a choice-of-forum provision is value enhancing.
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to a change in precedent.71 In the second scenario, we consider the
opposite regime shift, where the proportion of deals favoring the
convention changes from 70% to 30%. Here, we assume that the
regime change is immediately observable, an assumption consistent with regime changes induced by highly publicized events.
FIGURE 5: REGIME SHOCKS

From both simulations, it is clear that parties begin to adjust
their behavior when the shock occurs. In the left panel, a growing
trend toward adoption suddenly changes course, and parties increasingly reject the mutation as they observe more transactions
poorly adapted to it. In the right panel, the lawyers initially stick
with the conventional term while it is dominant, but they quickly
adopt the mutation when a mutation-favoring shock occurs. As
mentioned above, there is an initial and immediate increase in
the adoption rate because we assume that the lawyers directly
observe the change in the population, whereas in the simulation
to the left, they learn about the full extent of the shift over time.
These simulations demonstrate the importance of the underlying environment that generates each deal. As that environment
changes, we see gradual adaptation to the new regime by parties
through learning. That said, in both scenarios, the eventual diffusion pattern that takes hold has the effect of overshooting the
true population composition. Attorneys thus use their dealspecific information to adjust their overall expectations, but, over
time, they tend to set it aside with individual contracts, emulating the emergent norm.

71 See Nyarko, supra note 24, at 24 (suggesting that the use of templates may slow
down the pace of adoption); Kahan & Klausner, supra note 38, at 727–28 (arguing that
network effects may induce some amount of stickiness); GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 39,
at 33–45 (finding that, in the context of the pari passu clause, lawyers were slow to adapt
drafting practices to a novel judicial interpretation of the provision).
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b) Information shocks. A second type of shock is a shock
not to the underlying contracting environment but rather to information. In the benchmark case, we assumed that deal experience generates substantially private information for law firms. In
other words, the knowledge that each firm acquired in prior
transactions was not generally disclosed publicly; at most, it was
shared with the contractual partner in their current deal. This is
often a reasonable assumption because rules of professional conduct and private reputation-building incentives would both tend
to induce lawyers to keep client-specific information close to their
chests.72
That said, in certain contexts, private information is pooled
effectively for public consumption. For instance, in the M&A industry, the American Bar Association (ABA) conducts deal points
studies at regular intervals. For these studies, the ABA collects
information from merger agreements that parties have previously
disclosed to the SEC. The ABA then shares this information, including current trends in the adoption of certain contractual provisions, with the industry at large.73 Other examples of information pooling can be found in academic studies that examine
contractual practices. The release of information can create information shocks, during which the private deal making practices of
law firms become public knowledge.
We can incorporate information shocks and demonstrate
their effects on diffusion patterns within our model. Figure 6 does
this: In the two-hundredth round, we assume that all law firms
receive credible information about the adoption pattern in all
prior rounds. These firms then run internal simulations to assess
what diffusion path would have looked like if 𝑧 = 30% and what
it would have looked like if 𝑧 = 70%. Next, they compare the diffusion path of their internal simulation to the observed diffusion
path. They then update their beliefs based on the relative likelihood that the observed path would have emerged in each scenario. After making this determination, they update their baseline prior belief to incorporate all signals contained in the
information-pooling event.

72

See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021).
See Jessica C. Pearlman & Tatjana Paterno, Announcing the ABA’s 2019 Private
Target Mergers & Acquisitions Deal Points Study, A.B.A. (Jan. 14, 2020),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2020/01/deal-points.
73
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FIGURE 6: INFORMATION DUMPS

In the left panel of Figure 6, the information that is released
to the public about contract practices is accurate. To illustrate,
this scenario emulates the release of a deal points study that indicates whether other drafters believe that their deals benefit
from the mutation. It also publicizes who has chosen to adopt the
mutation so far. As can be seen, the intervention suddenly and
significantly increases the adoption rate. This is because lawyers
more quickly learn that many of them received the signal that the
adoption of the mutation is value enhancing. They thus more
quickly realize that, on average, it is beneficial to adopt the
mutation.
In contrast, in the right panel, we assume that the information shock releases inaccurate information. One can imagine
several reasons for why this might happen. Most events that seek
to update lawyers on contract-drafting practices are inherently
limited in the sample they can draw from. For instance, the most
comprehensive contracts database is the SEC’s EDGAR database.
In it, interested parties can find material contracts concluded by
publicly registered companies. However, many types of transactions are not represented. For instance, neither deals between
private companies nor those involving smaller stakes can be
found. Another potential reason for inaccurate information
shocks is that those who seek to pool information might limit their
sample size (e.g., by including only M&A transactions that exceed
$100 million). If skewed samples incorrectly represent the entire
population of deals, there is the danger that parties may draw
incorrect inferences from the pooling intervention.
As shown right panel, such incorrect pooling of information
generally delays the adoption of a mutation. However, absent extraordinary circumstances,74 parties will eventually accumulate

74 An example of an extraordinary circumstance would be if 𝑟 takes the extreme
0
value of 0 or 1.

936

The University of Chicago Law Review

[89:4

sufficient representative signals in their own practice to overcome
the incorrect inference that they drew from the pooling event.
This is significant because it suggests that, although incorrect information causes some harm to the adoption practice, drafters’
experience ultimately prevails.
III. AN ASSORTMENT OF DIFFUSION PATHS IN THE M&A MARKET
One of the useful attributes of simulating the outcome of diffusion patterns under our model is that it allows us to form intuitions about how to interpret patterns of diffusion that we see in
the real world. How well does the above analysis capture these
practices? In this Part, we turn to real-world data of contractual
evolution in the M&A market. Specifically, we focus on a collection of 2,141 M&A deals in excess of $100 million signed between
2000 and 2020. We ask whether their diffusion pathways appear
to resemble those identified in our model and simulations. In doing so, we again note that it should not be expected that any realword diffusion pattern maps exactly onto the patterns observed
during our simulations. As we highlight above, our model is an
abstraction, leading to much cleaner observations than can be
found in complex real-world data sets. As such, the evidence presented in this Part should be considered suggestive rather than
determinative.
When assessed against the backdrop of our model, real-world
practices display trends that enable us to determine possible contributors to diffusion and diagnose the normative desirability of
the observed trends. Perhaps most importantly, we find that the
merger-agreement provisions that we study do not all follow a
single evolutionary trajectory. Rather, our analysis finds that
some practices appear to follow one simulation pattern, while others follow a different one. From this comparison, we conclude that
the contractual evolution in the M&A market is far from
homogenous.75
Merger agreements are rich in dimensionality, typically containing a great number of provisions spanning dozens (if not hundreds) of pages.76 We focus here on a discrete subset of notable
terms:
(1) pandemic-related
force
majeure
provisions,
75 See generally Jennejohn, supra note 54 (finding evidence of diversity in a collection
of terms in M&A agreements from one large corporate law firm).
76 See John C. Coates IV, Why Have M&A Contracts Grown? Evidence from Twenty
Years of Deals 8–12 (ECGI Law Working Paper No. 333, 2016), https://perma.cc/89UYUFF9.
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(2) Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
(CFIUS) provisions, (3) reverse termination fees, (4) #MeToo
(Weinstein) provisions, (5) top-up options, and (6) choice-of-law
and -forum provisions. For the M&A specialist, these terms will
be quite familiar. Just as important, this list includes terms that
have been described by other observers over the last few decades
as exemplars of diffusion, mutation, and evolution.
In the sections below, we consider whether and how the reception of each term matches up with our modeling predictions.
Each of the following sections first provides a brief description of
a notable term, then illustrates the actual dynamic diffusion pattern of each such term over the last two decades. To formulate
these actual diffusion patterns, we draw on a substantial database of 2,141 hand-collected and -labeled merger agreements
spanning nearly two decades.77
Before continuing, we emphasize that our main aspiration in
this Part is to empirically illustrate the existence of the different
diffusion patterns captured by our theoretical model. This exercise is an important step for assessing whether the distinct paths
predicted by our theoretical framework have real-world analogues. At the same time, the empirical evidence highlighted below is not meant to serve as a formal validation of our model. To
do that, it would be necessary to recover the deep parameters of
our model and then undertake testing to see whether dynamics
evolve in a manner predicted. Such an enterprise would involve
marshaling a host of subjective and arbitrary decisions, requiring
multiple robustness checks to be convincing. Although we close
this Part with a brief overview of how a more rigorous empirical
implementation would play out,78 we concentrate below on intuitive illustrations.
A. MAEs and Pandemic Carveouts
The MAE or Material Adverse Change (MAC) provision is a
staple of any M&A transaction. It is used to allocate risk and pro-

77 We collected all publicly available M&A contracts for deals between 2000 and the
first half of 2020 that were valued above $100 million. We then labeled these contracts
according to whether they included certain provisions.
78 See infra Part III.G (providing an overview of how a more technical and rigorous
empirical implementation would play out).
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vide grounds for terminating a deal in the event that certain unforeseen circumstances occur.79 The basic MAE provision defines
the MAE (somewhat circularly) as “any event, circumstance, development, or condition occurring that has already had, or would
be reasonably expected to have, a[n] [MAE] on the target.”80 This
language is then typically followed by a list of carveouts or exceptions that—notwithstanding the foregoing language—would not
constitute an MAE. That is, these enumerated events would not
constitute sufficient grounds for termination. Carveouts can be
general (e.g., general macroeconomic or governmental events) or
specific (e.g., natural disasters, climate change, and other industry-specific risks).81 Finally, the MAE might also provide exceptions to the exceptions (sometimes called “carve ins”), stating that
the MAE exceptions could still constitute an MAE if, for instance,
an event has a disproportionate impact on the seller as compared
to other companies in the seller’s industry.82
Generally, the term “material” in an MAE provision is not
defined,83 so guidance on what actually constitutes an MAE sufficient to justify termination of a deal comes almost entirely from

79 Due to its importance, the modern MAE provision has become the subject of many
conceptual and empirical studies in recent years. See generally, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson &
Alan Schwartz, Understanding MACs: Moral Hazard in Acquisitions, 21 J.L., ECON. &
ORG. 330 (2005); Eric L. Talley, On Uncertainty, Ambiguity, and Contractual Conditions,
34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 755 (2009); Robert T. Miller, The Economics of Deal Risk: Allocating
Risk Through MAC Clauses in Business Combination Agreements, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV.
2007 (2009); Robert T. Miller, Canceling the Deal: Two Models of Material Adverse Change
Clauses in Business Combination Agreements, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 99 (2009); Andrew A.
Schwartz, A Standard Clause Analysis of the Frustration Doctrine and the Material Adverse Change Clause, 57 UCLA L. REV. 789 (2010); Eric Talley & Drew O’Kane, The Measure of a MAC: A Machine-Learning Protocol for Analyzing Force Majeure Clauses in M&A
Agreements, 168 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 181 (2012); David J. Denis &
Antonio J. Macias, Material Adverse Change Clauses and Acquisition Dynamics, 48 J. FIN.
& QUANT. ANALYSIS 819 (2013); Antonio J. Macias & Thomas Moeller, Target Signaling
with Material Adverse Change Clauses in Merger Agreements, 39 J. EMPIRICAL FIN. 69
(2016). The term, which once attracted primarily U.S.-focused commentary, is now also
taking on international dimensions. See generally, e.g., Narine Lalafaryan, Material Adverse Change Uncertainty: Costing a Fortune If Not Corporate Lives, 21 J. CORP. L. STUD.
39 (2020).
80 Andrew L. Burnstine & Perry F. Sofferman, COVID-19’s Impact on the M&A Market: Measures and Precautions, DAILY BUS. REV. (July 10, 2020), https://www.law.com/dailybusinessreview/2020/07/10/covid-19s-impact-on-the-ma-market-measures-and-precautions.
81 See Bryan Monson, Note, The Modern MAC: Allocating Deal Risk in the Post-IBP
v. Tyson World, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 769, 774 (2015).
82 Id. at 793.
83 Id. at 773.
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the courts. In 2001, In re IBP Shareholders’ Litigation84 provided
the now-standard interpretation of MAE clauses, reading the provision as incredibly seller-friendly and making three important
holdings: “First, the court held that a general economic or industry decline . . . could not alone constitute a MAC. Instead, the purchaser must show that the event had the ‘required materiality of
effect’ on the target.” 85 “Second, the court held that contractual
language . . . must be interpreted in light of the ‘negotiating realities’ and larger context in which the parties were contracting,”86
further noting the difference between financial and strategic buyers in an MAE context.87 Third, the court noted that “the decision
ultimately boiled down to a question of public policy . . . [that]
would likely require the purchaser to make a strong showing before allowing it to invoke a MAC exception to its obligation to
close.”88 Indeed, the Delaware Court of Chancery in In re IBP declined to find that an MAE had occurred.89 In that respect, the
case was a harbinger: buyers’ attempts to argue that an MAE had
occurred in subsequent cases would regularly founder on the
shoals of In re IBP’s rigorous standard.90 It was not until 2018
that the Delaware Chancery Court sided with a regretful buyer’s
claim that an MAE had indeed occurred, permitting the buyer to
terminate the deal on those grounds.91
While the basic structure of MAE provisions has remained
essentially standardized since the 1970s,92 certain events have

84

789 A.2d 14 (Del. Ch. 2001).
Monson, supra note 81, at 779 (quoting In re IBP, 789 A.2d at 66).
86 Id. (quoting In re IBP, 789 A.2d at 67).
87 When litigation concerns a financial buyer, it’s more likely that a short-term issue
could be a MAC, whereas a strategic buyer looking to acquire the company for reasons not
purely financial would be less likely to succeed in classifying a short-term dip in earnings
potential as an MAE. Vice Chancellor Leo Strine opined on the difference between financial and strategic buyers in In re IBP, stating that “[i]t is odd to think that a strategic
buyer would view a short-term blip in earnings as material, so long as the target’s
earnings-generating potential is not materially affected by that blip or the blip’s cause.”
789 A.2d at 67.
88 Monson, supra note 81, at 779 (citing In re IBP, 789 A.2d at 68).
89 In re IBP, 789 A.2d at 65–68.
90 See generally, e.g., Newmont Mining Corp. v. AngloGold Ashanti Ltd., No. 17-CV8065, 2020 WL 1285543 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2020); Channel Medsystems v. Bos. Sci.,
No. 2018-673, 2019 WL 6896462 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2019); Hexion Specialty Chems., Inc.
v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d 715 (Del. Ch. 2008); Frontier Oil Corp. v. Holly Corp.,
No. Civ. A. 20502, 2005 WL 1039027 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 2005).
91 Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG, No. 2018-300, 2018 WL 4719347, at *101 (Del.
Ch. Oct. 1, 2018).
92 See Monson, supra note 81, at 773.
85
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the potential to significantly and permanently impact MAE provisions. For example, early MAE provisions excluded any mention
of national-security-related risks; now, terrorism is included in
almost every MAE’s list of carveouts.93 The COVID-19 pandemic
has the potential to be another such permanent change to the
MAE formula. (Though recall that the LVMH–Tiffany deal did
not specifically invoke pandemics as a carveout even though it
specifically mentioned other explicit types of hazards.)
Figure 7 illustrates the dynamic adoption of pandemicspecific carveouts in MAE provisions. To qualify, we require that
the carveout explicitly make reference to a pandemic, disease,
public-health crisis, or something similar. Such carveouts were
virtually nonexistent prior to the 2009 H1N1 outbreak, though a
small number of provisions attended the earlier SARS and MERS
outbreaks outside of the United States. With H1N1, however, the
genuine possibility of pandemic-related risks appeared to become
more salient; accordingly, carveouts began to appear in an increasing number of deals. Toward the end of 2019, and particularly throughout 2020, pandemic-specific carveouts became more
popular, appearing in over a third of announced deals. All indications suggest that the popularity of such carveouts will continue
to accelerate.

93

See id. at 774.
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FIGURE 7: PANDEMIC CARVEOUTS OVER TIME

The largely monotonic and increasingly steep rise of
pandemic-related carveouts is suggestive of our benchmark case:
parties begin with a low assessment of pandemic relevance and
then reassess the underlying nature of the population of deals,
increasingly incorporating pandemic carveouts into their successive transactions. Note, however, that the change does not appear
to have been discontinuous, as one might have seen if, for example, a regime shock suddenly enabled attorneys to read the situation more effectively. This pattern, therefore, seems to have many
of the markings of a learning process in which succeeding generations of deals create momentum for subsequent adoptions. It is
perhaps still too early to diagnose whether the diffusion pattern
will ultimately overshoot the fraction of deals that might warrant
a pandemic carveout, so only time will tell whether the current
trend ultimately recedes before adoption becomes ubiquitous.
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B. CFIUS Regulatory Covenants
A second branch of potential diffusion patterns is regulatory
covenants in M&A deals. These terms typically address the broad
range of contingencies that can be vitally important to the deal’s
closing. The most familiar example is found in many large strategic acquisitions, which often allocate risks associated with obtaining antitrust approval from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
or the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Antitrust Division.94 Companies operating in certain industries, such as banking or electrical utilities, also require approval from the relevant regulatory
agencies.95 In most cases, the buyer will bear the regulatory risk
and be bound by an efforts standard—typically, “best efforts,”
“reasonable best efforts,” or “commercially reasonable efforts”—
to address a regulator’s anxieties about the transaction.96 Standard efforts language appears in most deals related to regulatory
risks and requirements, usually stopping short of the most extreme standard, “hell or highwater,”97 which places all the nonclosing risk on the buyer, requiring her to do what is necessary to
make the deal close—i.e., agreeing to whatever remedial
measures the agency demands.
Cross-border transactional lawyers have recently begun to
pay particularly close attention to international regulatory approvals related to foreign direct investment. CFIUS, tasked with
reviewing transactions “which could result in foreign control of
any person engaged in interstate commerce in the United
States,”98 has become relevant enough that “U.S. companies considering any level of foreign investment must have CFIUS on

94 The review of mergers for potential anticompetitive effects is undertaken by both
the FTC and the DOJ’s Antitrust Division in a dual regulatory system. See generally Philip
J. Weiser, Reexamining the Legacy of Dual Regulation: Reforming Dual Merger Review by
the DOJ and the FCC, 61 FED. COMMC’NS L.J. 167 (2008).
95 See generally Jeremy C. Kress, Modernizing Bank Merger Review, 37 YALE J. ON
REG. 435 (2020); Milton A. Marquis, DOJ, FTC and FERC Electric Power Merger Enforcement: Are There Too Many Cooks in the Merger Review Kitchen?, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
783 (2002).
96 Matthew Jennejohn, Innovation and the Institutional Design of Merger Control,
41 J. CORP. L. 167, 201–02 (2015) (situating parties’ efforts obligations within a broader
contractual allocation of uncertainty between the merging parties).
97 “Hell or highwater” language, which essentially corners the buyer into closing the
deal no matter the cost, was used in less than 5% of deals surveyed. For a discussion of
effort-standard language, see Fang Xue, Yuefan Wang & Qi Yue, Recent Trends and Issues
in Outbound Acquisitions by Chinese Companies, 20 M&A LAW. Nov./Dec. 2016, at 1, 3.
98 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a).
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their radar.”99 CFIUS has the power to recommend to the president one of three courses of action: block, clear, or require mitigation measures to be imposed on the transaction. These options
translate into opposing language by the buyer and seller: Sellers,
seeking closing assurances, want to prevent buyers from choosing
to walk away from a deal rather than complying with CFIUS’s
mitigation measures.100 Buyers, looking to preserve the option to
walk away for precisely that reason, seek language eliminating
liability in the event that CFIUS approval cannot be obtained.101
A complicated combination of factors influences parties’ uses
of regulatory-risk-allocation language in their merger agreements. On one hand, the intensity of regulatory review has been
increasing. In 2018, Congress passed the Foreign Investment
Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018102 (FIRRMA), significantly expanding CFIUS’s jurisdiction. Additionally, CFIUS provisions may change based on the growing categories of deals subjected to CFIUS review, particularly as the agency’s reach has
been significantly expanded. For example, the share of transactions that were subjected to CFIUS review rose from 26% to 46%
between 2014 and 2017.103 The new FIRRMA regulations finalized
in January 2020 promise to further change the population of
CFIUS-reviewed companies by widening the agency’s net to capture a much larger portion of the technology, insurance,104 and

99 MP McQueen, CFIUS Annual Report Shows Big Jump in Investigations, N.Y.L.J.
(Nov. 22, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/P385-MU88. McQueen reports that from 2014
through 2017, the number of investigations rose 237%. The growth appears to be more
concentrated on the back end: the percentage of transactions subjected to mitigation steps
was less than 10% per year between 2008 and 2015 but reached almost 20% in 2017. Additionally, the percentage of transactions subjected to the agency’s forty-five-day investigation process (rather than being cleared or blocked after the thirty-day review period)
rose from 46% in 2015 to 70% in 2017, with both numbers “far above the percentages in
most prior years.” CFIUS Taking a Larger Role in Inbound M&A, BAIRD (May 23, 2018),
https://perma.cc/D2MS-FVVW.
100 Sellers often negotiate for “best efforts,” “reasonable best efforts,” or “commercially
reasonable efforts” language related to the buyer’s obligations seeking approval, often including language stating that the buyer “agrees not to withhold unreasonably any consent
to any mitigation or other requirements imposed by CFIUS in connection with the CFIUS
[f]iling.” MARGARET GATTI, STEPHEN PAUL MAHINKA & CARL VALENSTEIN, MORGAN LEWIS,
CFIUS: THE INCREASING IMPORTANCE OF NATIONAL SECURITY REVIEWS IN M&A
TRANSACTIONS 37 (2016).
101 Buy-side negotiators seek language confirming that “the [b]uyer shall not be required to agree to any mitigation or other requirements as a condition of approval.” Id.
102 Pub. L. No. 115-232, § 1701, 132 Stat. 2174 (2018).
103 See McQueen, supra note 99.
104 For a discussion of the impact of the new CFIUS amendments on the insurance
sector, see Nicholas Klein, Gabriel Gershowitz & Prakash (PK) Paran, Insurance Sector
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real estate sectors. Currently of note is the possibility that “the
[COVID-19] pandemic may prompt CFIUS to examine health care
sector transactions more closely than before,”105 expanding
CFIUS’s real-world application in addition to its jurisdiction.106
On the other hand, the increased intensity of CFIUS review
is not felt uniformly across the market. Chinese investors have
been hit particularly hard, for instance. In 2016, due to regulatory
concerns, “Chinese buyers complete[d] just 67% of announced outbound deals.”107 In a further interesting twist, Chinese investors
have been offering a “China premium” instead of agreeing to
seller-friendly regulatory covenants in order to compensate for
the heightened regulatory risk, meaning that the investor increases their purchase-price offer to compensate for the potential
regulatory hurdles.108 Many sellers prefer such a premium to contractual risk allocation because many Chinese buyers are outside
the jurisdiction of necessary enforcement mechanisms and are
unwilling to subject themselves to extrajudicial enforcement
options.109
Finally, after Ralls Corp. v. Committee on Foreign
Investment,110 a 2014 case in which the proponents of a CFIUSaffected deal won a partial victory based on due process grounds,
there may be countervailing willingness of foreign buyers to take
risks if the review process is more transparent and transacting
Transactions to Face Increased Scrutiny, N.Y.L.J. (Nov. 19, 2020), achieved at
https://perma.cc/QH5T-WD95.
105 Anna Zhang, China Outbound Investment Decline Continues, Inbound Rises amid
COVID and Regulatory Challenges, LEGAL WEEK (June 22, 2020), https://perma.cc/M2QXQGLR.
106 As one observer recently wrote:
There is more monitoring of the investment universe than ever, so a decision not
to file is a riskier decision than it used to be. . . . [These days] it’s certainly wiser
to seek [CFIUS] clearance on a preclose basis than to close and then hide and
hope that the government won’t come looking for you later.
Vincent Chow, Chinese Investment in US Plummets Under Increased Scrutiny, LEGAL
WEEK (Aug. 20, 2020), https://perma.cc/BY7W-JLB7 (quoting Jeremy Zucker, cochair of
the International Trade and Government Regulation Practice at Dechert, LLP, in
Washington, D.C.). It is worth noting, though, that the recent change in presidential administration may signal a slight relinquishing of CFIUS power—yet another future uncertainty that may require explicit contractual allocation.
107 Xue et al., supra note 97, at 1.
108 Given how little control either party has and, thus, the near nonexistence of leverage in terms of responsibility for regulatory approval, Chinese buyers rarely use reverse
termination fees to alleviate CFIUS-risk concerns. Rather, they’re most often used “in a
competitive auction setting or in connection with submitting a topping bid.” Id. at 10.
109 See id.
110 758 F.3d 296 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
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parties are able to more accurately assess the risk of regulatory
prohibitions.111
FIGURE 8: CFIUS PROVISIONS OVER TIME

Figure 8 charts the empirical frequency of CFIUS-related
provisions in the deals that we track. Although Figure 8 displays
a very modest upward trajectory, it does not appear to manifest
the strong and nearly monotonic pattern of the pandemic carveouts above. Here, there appears to be significant annual variation, with relatively modest serial correlation over time. This pattern diverges from our benchmark case and, instead, has more of
the markings of a setting where the deal-specific signal is relatively precise and informative relative to population-wide averages. Recall that under such circumstances, lawyers do not have
to rely on market trends or information from other deals to determine the efficiency gains from the inclusion. Instead, they can
adopt the mutation depending on its predicted utility in the individual contract, leading to less discernable overall trends.

111 See id. at 325 (holding that the current CFIUS-review process, which does not
require CFIUS or the president to disclose the information which forms the basis of an
order, violated Ralls’s due process rights, and requiring CFIUS and the president to disclose to Ralls all nonconfidential information used in making their recommendations and
decisions during the review process).
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In many ways, it makes sense for CFIUS provisions to exhibit
such characteristics. The historical markers of CFIUS scrutiny—
cross-border deals, critical infrastructure, and national-securityrelated industries—are relatively easy to anticipate from observed deal attributes (such as participant countries, implicated
industries, and the nature of surviving ownership claims), allowing attorneys to customize their CFIUS-related provisions to each
deal. Rather than overshooting or undershooting the efficient
adoption rate, the inclusion of CFIUS provisions resembles a “just
right” type of diffusion, in which the contract is well tailored to
the situational environment.
C. Reverse Termination Fees
Reverse Termination Fees, or RTFs, (also known as “reverse
breakup fees”) are fees that the buyer in a transaction may be
obligated to pay if the deal fails to close. These provisions were
first introduced in the 1980s but became more prevalent during
the dot-com bubble, when private equity (PE) buyers began negotiating RTF provisions into deals to protect themselves in the
event that they were unable to obtain adequate financing.112
Sellers generally accepted RTFs for two reasons: First, during
times of economic uncertainty, sellers felt that RTFs further incentivized buyers to obtain adequate financing while simultaneously offering sure compensation if a buyer failed. Second, RTFs
provided extra security for sellers who felt that the threat to a
purchasing company’s reputation in the event that they failed to
obtain the necessary financing to close a transaction was simply
insufficient collateral.113
The increased use of RTFs followed a spike in going-private
transactions between 2005 and 2007, with language in strategic

112 See Afra Afsharipour, Transforming the Allocation of Deal Risk Through Reverse
Termination Fees, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1161, 1219–20 (2010).
113 Afra Afsharipour, Paying to Break Up: The Metamorphosis of Reverse Termination
Fees 29–30 (U.C. Davis Legal Stud. Rsch. Paper No. 191, 2009), https://perma.cc/F2SGWP62. Until around 2007, financial buyers often walked away from negotiations with a
financing out, collateralized essentially by their reputation, while strategic buyers were
much more likely to face litigation and ultimately damages liability. Vice Chancellor
Strine noted that this was an “interesting asymmetry” and that “the factors driving it
seem to include both economically rational ones and ones that are less rational.” In re
Topps Co. S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 72 n.11 (Del. Ch. 2007).
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transactions mirroring that of PE deals.114 By 2006, 25%115 of all
transactions—both strategic and financial116—included RTFs; in
2007, that number had risen to nearly 35%.117 When the financial
crisis hit in 2008, strategic buyers began to face more stringent
lending and credit standards and were treated more like financial
buyers by banks and lenders,118 which encouraged strategic buyers to begin negotiating RTFs into their deals as well. By the
2008–mid-2009 period, 26.1% of strategic transactions included
RTFs, up from 16.9% in the 2003–04 period.119
The RTF structure transformed as the provisions became
more commonplace. Originally, RTFs were essentially just the
flip side of the traditional seller-termination-fee coin, but, by
2008, three distinct styles of RTFs had emerged. First, the twotier approach provided for the payment of two RTFs conditioned
on different sets of triggers and occasionally permitted the seller
to seek specific performance.120 Second, the hybrid approach limited a buyer’s liability for payment of the RTF in the event that
circumstances beyond their control ultimately resulted in the termination of a deal but allowed a seller to seek specific perfor-

114 Afsharipour, supra note 113, at 49. See generally Dhruv Chand Aggarwal, The
Agency Costs of Sellside Deal Protection: An Empirical Analysis of Reverse Termination
Fees (March 25, 2020) (working paper), https://perma.cc/U4HU-FEB3; John C. Coates,
Darius Palia & Ge Wu, Reverse Termination Fees in M&A (Jan. 26, 2018) (working paper),
https://perma.cc/8QXA-XH57; Brian J.M. Quinn, Optionality in Merger Agreements, 35
DEL. J. CORP. L. 789 (2010).
115 2007 TRANSACTION TERMINATION FEE STUDY 18, HOULIHAN LOKEY (2008),
https://perma.cc/9BC5-NETQ.
116 Afsharipour, supra note 112, at 1169–70 (alteration in original) (quoting THERESE
H. MAYNARD, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 63 (2d ed. 2009)):

Strategic transactions generally involve operating synergies between the businesses of the buyer and the seller, or the aggregation of greater market power
in a particular product line, for example the combination of two pharmaceutical
companies. . . . Private equity buyers seek to acquire companies that they can
grow and/or improve with the ultimate goal of “selling the cleaned up company
to another buyer within a few years for a substantial gain, or alternatively, [taking] the company public.”
117

2007 Transaction Termination Fee Study, supra note 115, at 18.
Afsharipour, supra note 113, at 55–56.
119 Id. at 73.
120 The Merck-Schering transaction mandated an RTF of $2.5 billion if the transaction failed to close due to a financing failure. If the transaction failed to close due to a lack
of shareholders’ approval or Merck engaged in a competing third-party transaction, Merck
owed only a $1.25 billion RTF. Id. at 52–53.
118
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mance in the event that the buyer was responsible for circumstances leading to a transaction’s termination.121 Third, the
option-style approach essentially provided a worst-case scenario
for buyers, giving them “broad walk-away rights with their exposure to damages limited to the RTF.”122
Between the 2003–04 period and the 2008–mid-2009 period,
the percentage of strategic deals which included RTFs utilizing
the option-style structure rose from 8.8% to 26.3%.123 During the
2008 financial crisis, a record number of buyers walked away
from deals, many taking advantage of the option-style RTFs,
“which either permitted the buyer to walk [away] for any reason
or gave the buyer broad latitude to arrange triggering of the payment of [a] fee”124—often representing less than 10% of a deal’s
transaction value.125
Many scholars believed that the record breakdown of deals
represented the end of the RTF, but, by the 2015–17 period, 86%
of large-market transactions and 50% of middle-market transactions were still memorialized by agreements containing RTFs.126
However, the content of recent RTFs appears to differ from that
of their predecessors. More RTFs now provide for limited specificperformance rights, employing a two-tier or hybrid structure,127

121

In Pfizer’s $68 billion purchase of Wyeth, the $4.5 billion RTF would be triggered
only in the event that Pfizer could not obtain financing for reasons specified in the merger
agreement; if Pfizer experienced a financing failure for any other reason, Wyeth could
either seek specific performance or terminate the deal and collect the RTF from Pfizer. At
the termination date, Pfizer would then have the option to close the deal with alternate
financing or terminate the deal and pay Wyeth the RTF. Id. at 49–51.
122 Id. at 53. Additionally, in United Rentals v. Ram Holdings, Inc., 937 A.2d 810 (Del.
Ch. 2007), the court ultimately found that the buyer’s perception of the RTF as essentially
an option, or walk-away right, was reasonable. Thus, if the buyer walked away, the seller’s
recourse was limited to the RTF, even if the termination was created by the buyer’s own
breach. Id. at 832–33.
123 Of the 26.1% of deals that included an RTF, 33.8% had RTFs coupled with provisions making the RTF the sole and exclusive remedy, precluding the seller from seeking
specific performance. Afsharipour, supra note 113, at 44, 47–48.
124 Id. at 48.
125 Id. at 22; see also RICHARD A. PRESUTTI, MATTHEW J. GRUENBERG, ANDREW J.
FADALE, STAVAN S. DESAI, WILLIAM J. MORICI & DAVID M. ROTHENBERG, SCHULTE ROTH
& ZABEL, PRIVATE EQUITY BUYER/PUBLIC TARGET M&A DEAL STUDY: 2015-17 REVIEW AND
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 4 (2018).
126 These figures were down from 92% and 83%, respectively, in 2013–14. Id. at 15.
127 In 2015–17, 81% of large-market transactions and 45% of middle-market transactions offered the seller limited specific-performance rights. Further, 83% of middle-market
deals had provided limited specific-performance rights for the seller in the 2013–14 period.
Put another way, 17% of large-market transactions offered the seller limited specific-
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or are limited to instances where the buyer is unable to obtain
adequate financing or regulatory (specifically antitrust) approval.128 Additionally, RTFs—especially those limited to financial or regulatory failures—are often coupled with a reasonable
best efforts standard, which has been key in protecting sellers in
litigation following the breakdown of a deal.129

performance rights, increasing to 19% in the 2015–17 period. In contrast, 55% of transactions in the 2015–17 period offered the seller full specific-performance rights, up from only
17% in 2013–14. Id. at 13.
128 In 2005–19, 12.1% of deals had RTFs with antitrust-specific triggers. Dale Collins,
Antitrust Reverse Termination Fees--2019 Q3 Update, SHEARMAN & STERLING: ANTITRUST
UNPACKED (Dec. 10, 2019), https://perma.cc/NW5A-SJZB.
129 In Hexion Chemicals, Inc. v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d 715, the Delaware
Chancery Court evaluated whether the buyer had materially breached its representations,
warranties, or covenants by trying to use the RTF as an option without first seeking alternate financing. Vice Chancellor Stephen Lamb held that
to the extent that an act was both commercially reasonable and advisable to
enhance the likelihood of consummation of the financing, the onus was on [the
buyer] to take that act. To the extent that [the buyer] deliberately chose not to
act, but instead pursued another path designed to avoid consummation of the
financing, [the buyer] knowingly and intentionally breached this covenant.
Id. at 749 (emphasis in original).
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FIGURE 9: REVERSE TERMINATION FEES OVER TIME

Figure 9 illustrates the frequency of RTFs over time. Much
like CFIUS provisions, RTFs appear to have very weak discernible patterns. One interpretation is that, like with CFIUS provisions, these terms are generally more likely to “get it right” from
deal to deal, depending on structure. For example, financing costs
remained at historic lows coming out of the 2008 financial crisis,
and cash buyers were unlikely to categorically find value in preserving an escape hatch in their deal through an RTF. In addition,
as markets stabilized, many industry sectors hosting stock-based
transactions were subject to less external volatility (once again
reducing the attractiveness of an RTF).
Perhaps because of some of these general reasons, since
around 2016, RTFs have become mildly less popular in the deals
that we have tracked. The reduction in take-up, however, does not
appear as precipitous as in other settings, and thus, even if there
were a general trend away from RTFs since 2016, it has manifested with an uneven pattern that suggests that deal-to-deal heterogeneity is responsible for most of the fluctuation. Indeed, such
idiosyncratic heterogeneity is perhaps the most plausible candidate that can be identified with our canonical patterns simulated
above.
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D. #MeToo Representations
Around the beginning of 2018, as the #MeToo movement became a household conversation topic, it became clear that the
risks associated with sexual harassment allegations against a
company’s executives were not just reputational but also economic, as companies began to realize that “sexual harassment allegations and lawsuits . . . could actually sink a deal and have significant ramifications.”130 In response to the “major financial
risk”131 of undisclosed or post-closing sexual harassment scandals,
lawyers began adding #MeToo provisions to transaction agreements, disclaiming a party’s knowledge of allegations of sexual
harassment within or against employees of the company within a
specified timeframe. The first of these clauses appeared in a
March 2018 deal between SJW Group and Connecticut Water
Services.132 Within a year, thirty-nine publicly disclosed deals contained these so-called Weinstein clauses.133 The clause can appear
in a variety of incarnations—including a representation, an MAE
provision, or even a closing condition—but the most common (and
effective) form is “a representation and warranty by the target . . .
that since a specific date no allegations of sexual harassment or
misconduct have been made against the company’s officers or executives.”134 Breaches of this representation offer the buyer recourse, though the extent of the remedy varies depending on
whether the deal is private or public.135
Most #MeToo representations follow a now familiar protocol
pattern:136 a specified look-back period, limitations regarding relevant employees, related disclosure schedules, and a knowledge
standard.137 Each of these steps can limit or expand the scope of
130 Chelsea Naso, #MeToo Movement Molds New Protections in Mergers, LAW360
(Jan. 18, 2019), https://perma.cc/8MNV-F568.
131 Id.
132 Jaclyn Jaeger, The ‘Weinstein Clause’: M&A Deals in the #MeToo Era,
COMPLIANCE WK. (Oct. 12, 2018), https://perma.cc/7XSB-HN2P.
133 Anna Windemuth, The #MeToo Movement Migrates to M&A Boilerplate, 129 YALE
L.J. 488, 503 (2019).
134 Burnett, supra note 69.
135 Clawbacks—allowing the buyer to recoup some of its investment or purchase
price—appear more often in private-company acquisitions, though the clauses have “more
discursive potential in the public-deal context,” given the reputational impact that including or excluding such a provision might have on a company’s reputation regardless of the
underlying allegations. Windemuth, supra note 133, at 498.
136 See id. at 503 (surveying nine specific features common to Weinstein clauses).
137 These standards tend to vary in accordance with typical negotiation-related factors like the leverage of the respective companies, but it is worth noting that in the context
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the following general idea: “Since x date there have been no sexual harassment allegations against the company’s executives.”138
The look-back period is most commonly three to five years.139 The
representations generally cover allegations against only highlevel employees and are often limited in application to allegations
against anyone at the rank of senior vice president or above.140
Disclosure schedules are used less frequently but can be a useful
qualification tool, as they remain confidential. However, some
practitioners note that a “prefatory reference to a disclosure
schedule might . . . suggest[ ] that [a company] has significant
sexual-harassment liabilities,”141 so target companies are wary of
such a method of incorporating allegations.142 The knowledge
standard is perhaps the most variable term: target companies
seek to limit their liability by requiring actual knowledge or limiting the knowledge requirement to “personnel who would ‘reasonably be expected to have actual knowledge’ of [such] matter[s],”143 while buyers often prefer a constructive knowledge
requirement.144 Essentially, the Weinstein clause ends up operating as a guideline with respect to the level of due diligence that
an acquirer must conduct to accurately assess the risk affiliated
with a target company.
There are two general points worth noting about the underlying idea behind #MeToo representations and their variations:

of Weinstein representations, there is more pressure in certain industries, with “[t]he provision[s] disproportionately appear[ing] in deals involving ‘strong, founder-led businesses,’
such as ‘technology and media and entertainment companies.’” Id. at 516 (quoting a telephone interview with a subject).
138 Burnett, supra note 69.
139 Additionally, some representations include two time periods: one (usually shorter)
regarding allegations required to be reported and one (usually longer) for complaints. See
Market Trends 2019: #MeToo Representations, LEXIS PRACTICAL GUIDANCE.
140 See id.
141 Windemuth, supra note 133, at 508.
142 Id. at 508–09.
143 Id. at 507 (citing Pac. Biosciences of Cal., Inc., Agreement and Plan of Merger 7
(Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1) (Nov. 5, 2018)).
144 Constructive knowledge widens the scope by including in the representations allegations that the target company might have uncovered with reasonable investigation. A
buyer’s preference would obviously be to have no knowledge requirement—and therefore
unlimited liability on the seller’s behalf—but of all publicly filed M&A contracts (as of
June 17, 2019), only seven deals (or 16%) did not include a knowledge qualifier, implying
“it would take a strong buyer to keep it out.” Burnett, supra note 69. For a discussion of
actual versus constructive knowledge requirements in the context of Weinstein representations, see Javon Johnson, Comment, An Epidemic of Workplace Sexual Misconduct: The
Birth of the Weinstein Clause in Merger and Acquisition Agreements, 52 TEX. TECH. L. REV.
377, 401 (2020).
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First, the inclusion of these representations highlight the level of
risk associated with sexual harassment as opposed to other types
of litigation that a company may face. Second, the representations
require a target to affirm its knowledge of allegations of sexual
harassment or misconduct, lowering the threshold for disclosure
below any legally anointed claim.145 These two unique aspects of
#MeToo representations emphasize (1) how hyperaware buyers
currently are of the “potentially devastating financial and social
consequences of [ ] sexual misconduct”146 and (2) the “relationship
between corporate dealings and social norms.”147 Some have expressed concerns related to due process issues stemming from disclosure of unproven allegations or the possibility that #MeToo
representations encourage a target company to discourage reporting to increase the likelihood of an acquisition. However, given
the depth of due diligence that companies conduct when looking
into a potential target, it is equally likely that companies, especially startups, might actually reevaluate the mechanisms by
which they handle such misconduct.148 It remains to be seen
whether the Weinstein clauses have taken their final form, but
the legal world has generally accepted that the provisions are
here to stay.
Figure 10 illustrates the adoption of #MeToo representations
over time. Note the facial similarity to pandemic carveouts of the
significant uptick in adoption, which is also consistent with our
benchmark case. For Weinstein representations, however, the
sudden increase is even more explosive, with a dramatic spike in
2018 alone. Such seemingly discontinuous shifts, then, also seem
consistent with our regime-shift simulations,149 in which the underlying economics of the inclusion of the provision suddenly
shift. This seems consistent with the arrival of the #MeToo movement at around the same time, with an increased call for companies to renew their vigilance (or embrace it for the first time) in
redressing long-standing allegations of sexual harassment and
abuse among their most senior executives.

145 See Burnett, supra note 69. Additionally of note is the fact that all thirty-nine
deals published within the first year of the Weinstein clause’s introduction left the word
“allegation” undefined. Windemuth, supra note 133, at 512.
146 Mergers & Acquisitions Alert: #MeToo Movement Gives Rise to Use of “Weinstein
Clause” in M&A Transactions, ARCHER (Aug. 2018), https://perma.cc/U8NT-YJ9F.
147 Johnson, supra note 144, at 407.
148 Windemuth, supra note 133, at 525 & n.181.
149 See supra Figure 5.
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FIGURE 10: #METOO REPRESENTATIONS OVER TIME

As with pandemic carveouts, it is difficult to know whether
the diffusion pattern of #MeToo provisions will continue to rocket
upward or will equilibrate to a “new normal.” Alternatively, for
example, the dramatic shift in awareness of sexual-harassment
issues could cause firms to become far more perceptive in diagnosing where and when such problems exist, and the new normal
in this case might well converge only to a subset of companies
where the signals look particularly worrisome.
E. Top-Up Options
Top-up options refer to special stock options that can be
granted by the board of a target company to a bidder who has
launched a tender offer for the target.150 Exercising the options
allows the bidder to purchase newly issued shares in order to

150

See Steven M. Davidoff, The Return of the Tender Offer, M&A LAW PROF BLOG
(July 10, 2007), https://perma.cc/3P6C-DT9U. See generally MARK A. MORTON & JOHN F.
GROSSBAUER, POTTER ANDERSON & COROON, TOP-UP OPTIONS AND SHORT FORM MERGERS
(2002), https://perma.cc/X8L6-U7M5; Erik Devos, William B. Elliot & Hilmi Songur, TopUp Options and Tender Offers (May 7, 2014) (working paper), https://perma.cc/2KWF9N6R; Coates, supra note 54.
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reach the 90% ownership threshold necessary to effectuate a
short-form merger. Historically, this threshold was critical for
many bidders, because, once they crossed it, they could make use
of a special Delaware statute (Delaware General Corporate Law
(DGCL) § 253) to execute a short-form, back-end merger, forcing
all remaining holdout shareholders to relinquish their shares.151
Typically, in order to exercise the options, the bidder must have
been sufficiently successful in their tender offer to get within
“spitting distance” of 90%, usually measured as above some specified point in the 75–85% ownership range of the target. For several years, top-up options were an effective way for bidders unable to reach the 90% threshold with their initial tender offer to
avoid the potentially lengthy process of a long-form merger where
the target corporation was required to hold a stockholder meeting
to approve the deal.152
Top-up options first began to appear in 1999 and started to
gain particular traction after 2006, when a new rule enacted by
the SEC reduced some of the litigation risk associated with their
use. By 2008, the inclusion of top-up options had become standard—100% of negotiated tender offers from that year
included one.
In recent years, however, top-up options have lost some of
their luster due to a statutory reform that made them less necessary. In 2013, the Delaware legislature amended DCGL § 251 by
introducing § 251(h).153 Section 251(h) introduced a somewhat
more forgiving approach for two-step mergers that would allow
an acquirer to freeze out the holdout shareholders even when they
comprised up to 49.9% of the shareholder base. Because of this
relaxed threshold, the need for top-ups to get to 90% ownership
was substantially mooted.
Figure 11 illustrates the empirical frequency of top-up options over the span of our data. The pattern here is striking:
although top-ups were on a precipitous rise starting around 2005,
they collapsed after 2013, and now top-ups barely register a pulse
in annual frequencies. The up-and-down pattern of this chart
looks most like the regime-shock simulations in Figure 5 above.

151

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (2021).
MORTON & GROSSBAUER, supra note 150, at 2 n.11.
153 Daniel I. Fisher, DCGL Section 251(h): Top-Up Option No Longer Needed, AG
DEAL DIARY (Sept. 3, 2013), https://perma.cc/V72Z-ZZPZ; James Matarese & Danielle
Lauzon, Death of the Top-Up Option in Two-Step Transactions, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Oct.
17, 2013), https://perma.cc/GH5S-HRGJ.
152
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FIGURE 11: TOP-UP OPTIONS OVER TIME

Viewed against the statutory context described above, the regime-shock label is an apt one. The promulgation of DGCL
§ 251(h) in 2013 substantially sucked the wind from the sails of
top-up options because it dramatically lowered the threshold necessary to pull off a two-step merger. Moreover, with a lower
threshold (usually 50%) in such deals, the continued use of a topup to make it over the finish line would be particularly perilous,
since many such transactions would likely invoke heightened fiduciary duties under the doctrine of Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews
& Forbes Holdings, Inc.,154 and a top-up would seem especially
suspect.
F.

Choice-of-Law and -Forum Provisions

The final provision that we study is the inclusion of a term
selecting the forum that will govern any disputes arising from the
contract, typically referred to as a choice-of-forum provision. A
choice-of-forum provision establishes personal jurisdiction of a
court in case a dispute arises between the parties. In effect, it is

154

9 n.12.

506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); see also Morton & Grossbauer, supra note 150, at 6,
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a contractual device to reduce uncertainty in contractual relationships with parties that have connections to several jurisdictions.155 Many modern commercial transactions fall into this category because factors like the state of incorporation, the place in
which contract negotiations occur, and the location of performance can occur in different locations, and each can establish personal jurisdiction. In the context of M&A, choice-of-forum provisions are of particular interest because they can reflect two
competing interests of the parties. On the one hand, most corporations are incorporated in Delaware, and its courts have garnered significant expertise in presiding over corporate law disputes.156 At the same time, New York has long been the favored
jurisdiction for business law disputes, including most commercial
contract disputes.157 The preference is at least partially the result
of a concentrated effort by New York courts to adhere to a strict,
textualist interpretation of contractual language. Indeed, New
York is famous for sticking to the “four corners” of the writings as
it interprets the contract, thus providing the certainty and predictability often sought by commercial parties.158
Traditionally, it has been relatively easy for parties to access
courts in New York. In assessing personal jurisdiction, courts

155 For a detailed account of the choices that parties have to address the uncertainty,
see David A. Hoffman, Whither Bespoke Procedure?, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 389, 425–29 (analyzing the extent to which parties make use of their contractual liberty to customize the
forum and procedure broadly). For a discussion of choice-of-forum provisions and how they
are interpreted in practice, see John F. Coyle, Interpreting Forum Selection Clauses, 104
IOWA L. REV. 1791, 1803–19 (2019) (discussing the scope of interpretation for forumselection clauses).
156 Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, Delaware’s Competitive Reach, 9 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 92, 98 (2012) (studying the attraction of Delaware for corporate
litigation and finding that it is highly valued by attorneys in this particular context).
157 See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to New York: An Empirical Study of Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies’
Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1475, 1504 (2009) (finding that New York is the most prominent forum for commercial disputes); see also Nyarko, supra note 24, at 39 (confirming
these findings using a larger sample of commercial agreements).
158 The four-corners rule

imparts “stability to commercial transactions by safeguarding against fraudulent claims, perjury, death of witnesses . . . infirmity of memory . . . [and] the
fear that the jury will improperly evaluate the extrinsic evidence.” Such considerations are all the more compelling in the context of real property transactions,
where commercial certainty is a paramount concern.
W.W.W. Assocs., Inc. v. Giancontieri, 566 N.E.2d 639, 642 (N.Y. 1990) (alterations in original) (citation omitted) (citing EDITH L. FISCH, F ISCH ON N EW YORK EVIDENCE § 42
(2d ed. 1977)).
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used to apply the “doing business” test, under which it was sufficient that a company does business “with a fair measure of permanence and continuity” in New York to establish jurisdiction.159
Since most companies trying to access New York courts did some
amount of business there, a choice-of-forum provision may have
been obsolete. However, in 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court started
narrowing the test to the “essentially at home” test, which limits
general jurisdiction over a company to its place of incorporation
and its principal place of business.160 And although these disputes
were not contract disputes, courts in New York quickly embraced
the narrower test to reject jurisdiction in contracts cases.161 Most
importantly for our purposes, since it has become more difficult
to access New York courts without a choice-of-forum provision,
the change in precedent can be understood as a regime shock of
the type we discussed above.
Figure 12 depicts the incidence of choice-of-forum provisions
that establish the jurisdiction of New York courts. Relatively few
contracts started out including a choice-of-forum provision. However, in 2010, at the advent of the change in precedent, the inclusion rate suddenly and dramatically increased, from about 13% to
over 50% in subsequent years. Such a dramatic increase is consistent with our regime-shock example, providing preliminary evidence that drafters in the M&A context observed and quickly adjusted to their changed environment.162

159

See, e.g., Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915, 917 (N.Y. 1917).
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011); see
also Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 139 (2014).
161 See, e.g., Blustein v. Akam, No. 7855/2016, 2017 WL 2529647, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
May 2, 2017) (denying jurisdiction in a breach of contract case with references to Daimler
and Goodyear); Trodale Holdings, LLC v. Bristol Healthcare Invs., LP, No. 16 Civ. 4254,
2017 WL 5905574, at *9–10 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2017) (applying the “essentially at home”
test to deny jurisdiction over companies incorporated in Georgia and Tennessee); Letom
Mgmt. Inc. v. Centaur Gaming, LLC, No. 17 Civ. 3793, 2017 WL 4877426, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 27, 2017) (denying general jurisdiction over a defendant incorporated in Indiana under the “essentially at home” test).
162 We note that one of us has previously conducted a study of commercial contracts
more generally to assess whether there was a change in the proclivity to include choice-offorum provisions for any jurisdiction following a change in Supreme Court jurisprudence.
Such an effect was not observable in this broader context. See Nyarko, supra note 24, at
59–64.
160
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FIGURE 12: CHOICE OF FORUM OVER TIME

G. Formal Calibration and Testing
As noted at the outset of this Part, our efforts to track an assortment of adoption trajectories serve principally as a way to illustrate the plausibility of the various paths that our theoretical
framework is capable of generating. While a helpful (and, in many
respects, necessary) way to apply any model to real-world data,
our treatment has been deliberately informal and heuristic. We
acknowledge, however, that some readers may want more technical treatment of how one could use empirical methods to calibrate the deep parameters of our model (such as 𝑍, 𝑟0 , and 𝛾) and
test the parameters against a variety of hypotheses. Although developing such an approach is beyond the scope of this Article, we
briefly pause here to offer an overview of a promising approach
that we plan to pursue in future work.
Calibrating our model using real-world data would require
developing a statistical methodology by which to “fit” an observed
diffusion path against our underlying theoretical framework. The
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simplicity of doing so, however, can vary from context to context.
Certain theoretical models, for example, generally lend themselves to this enterprise, since they yield solutions that are linear
in the relevant parameters and, thus, can be estimated confidently with linear-regression techniques.163 In other settings, the
relationships generated are not linear but still tractably nonlinear, enabling modest modifications of linear regression.164
Our model corresponds to neither approach, since it does not
generate closed-form solutions (be they linear or nonlinear), and
thus it can only be solved numerically, through simulation. That
said, it is still possible to calibrate our framework by embedding
our simulations themselves into an iterative model that estimates
deep parameters to maximize the likelihood of observing our patterns. Such “simulated maximum likelihood” approaches are increasingly common in empirical finance165 and lend themselves
well to this environment. Our tentative efforts to utilize this approach—while still too preliminary to report here—appear promising.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
In the foregoing Parts, we have developed, analyzed, and applied to real-world data a holistic framework for contract-term
evolution. We have shown that patterns of diffusion not only can
manifest in several distinct ways but that they appear to do so
with some regularity in practice. While certain diffusion patterns
appear to bear the markers of cascading sorts of behavior (diffusing quickly and categorically), others suggest a more bespoke tailoring of terms to fit the context. This Part considers the broader
implications of our analysis. We highlight three such implications
here: (1) adjudicating between the competing accounts of contractual evolution outlined in Part I, (2) developing a theory of bargaining in transactions where prices are fixed early on and

163 See generally, e.g., Michel Terraza & Roman Mestre, Adjusted Beta Based on an
Empirical Comparison of OLS -CAPM and the CAPM with EGARCH Errors, 26 INT’L. J.
FIN. & ECON. 3588 (2020) (comparing a variety of linear regression models to estimate the
Capital Asset Pricing Model in finance).
164 See generally Matthew Spitzer & Eric Talley, Left, Right, and Center: Strategic
Information Acquisition and Diversity in Judicial Panels, 29 J.L., ECON. & ORG. 638 (2013)
(calibrating a nonlinear model of judicial deliberation).
165 See generally, e.g., Jon Danielsson, Stochastic Volatility in Asset Prices: Estimation
with Simulated Maximum Likelihood, 64 J. ECONOMETRICS 375 (1994) (using similar
methods to analyze a variety of financial dynamic asset pricing models).
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nonprice terms follow, and (3) extending our framework to take
on nonrational-actor decision-making.
The first, and perhaps the most important, implication of our
analysis concerns what it reveals about the stylized accounts of
contract evolution discussed in Part I. While each of the
Goldilocks accounts highlighted has some intuitive appeal, they
are difficult to reconcile into a complete, parsimonious, and general picture of term evolution. And our analysis above exposes
several of these limitations. For example, the just-right account
makes a strong prediction that terms should hew closely to
economic-efficiency considerations underlying a deal. All else constant, a novel term should be adopted if and only if it creates value
for the parties who adopt it. A direct corollary to this point is that
when the economics of different transactions are highly heterogeneous (a reasonable assumption in most cases), efficient terms
should echo that heterogeneity as negotiators fashion bespoke
terms. Our analysis, however, demonstrates that such heterogeneity is far from inevitable, even for the most motivated and rational negotiators. Particularly in settings where attorneys have
limited information or expertise, they will not be able to identify
with certainty the most efficient term on a deal-by-deal basis.
Moreover, as our benchmark simulations show, attorneys may
even begin rationally to ignore deal-specific information that they
are able to ascertain, particularly if they come to believe that population characteristics heavily favor one type of term over another. In such settings, drafting practices can start to resemble a
“contractual cascade,” with attorneys gravitating toward a monolithic term. This untailored term might yield beneficial results on
average, but it remains a blunt instrument of contractual design.
At the same time, neither the too-cold nor the too-hot accounts of contract evolution provides a complete picture. Consider
the former, which posits that terms will stubbornly (and inefficiently) resist change. Such outcomes could also occur within our
framework, which does not assume any special form of risk aversion or profound lack of sophistication. Yet within our framework,
the rise of an inefficient “black hole” would generally require several special preconditions. Most immediately, it would require
that attorneys begin with an incorrect prior belief that the conventional term is optimal overall. Second, the negotiators would
need to have limited information and expertise so that their (incorrect) beliefs about the overall population prove difficult to overcome. And finally, other limitations would have to be so severe as
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to prevent transacting attorneys from effectively learning over a
reasonable period of time—either because they lack an understanding of their transaction or because the number of firms is so
large that repeat play and concomitant learning by doing is not
possible. When learning is possible over time, the system might
still gravitate to a single modal term, but that term will be resilient over time only if it gets it right most of the time. Black holes
could certainly emerge in some special cases of our framework,
but the predicate conditions seem hardly general.
A second implication of our analysis is that it may help us to
investigate deeper quandaries about how complex transactions
are negotiated by lawyers. As is well known, large corporate
transactions and financings often follow a pattern that an economist would find odd (if not backwards): essential terms—and particularly the price—are usually set first, and only afterward are
the remaining terms negotiated. This pattern is unusual in many
ways, since the price is a key mechanism for distributing the
gains provided by nonprice terms. If, for example, it is more efficient for a deal to have a pandemic carveout, its inclusion will
likely impose greater risks and costs on the buyer, who is now
constrained in her capacity to walk away from the deal. One way
to convince the buyer to accept the efficient carveout is to give the
buyer a downward price concession, allowing her to monetize
some fraction of the gains created. When the price is fixed first,
such fluid monetary “settling up” is no longer possible.
Our model for contract-term evolution may contain the seeds
for resolving this paradox in that it reveals how and when a similar type of efficient settling up could still operate through informal bartering of nonprice terms. In other words, efficient bargaining when the price is already fixed can still occur so long as there
exists a nonprice term that operates somewhat like a price. For
example, suppose that deals increasingly came to warrant pandemic carveouts in force majeure provisions and that this trend
was driven by considerations for value creation. By definition, the
adoption of the carveout increases the joint surplus for the parties, but alone it could make the buyer worse off by imposing additional risk on them. A sophisticated buyer might still agree to
this term if the seller is willing to adjust one of the more fluid,
pricelike provisions of the deal, such as the size of the buyer’s
RTF. Viewed in this context, then, we might find evidence of effi-
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cient bargaining in nonprice terms if RTF triggers shrink (benefitting buyers) at the same time that pandemic exclusions proliferate (imposing costs on the buyer).166
Finally, our framework represents a good starting point for
developing deeper accounts of term evolution that combine learning dynamics with other “bounded rationality” theories of contracting. Behavioral economics and finance, for example, have
generated scores of insights about how parties may behave in a
way that diverges (at least in some degree) with rational-actor
models. In our framework, it would be possible to introduce behavioral biases into the learning process in several ways. For instance, there is growing evidence that even sophisticated parties
tend to deviate from strict Bayesian reasoning when assessing
their environments, often placing too much weight on their own
prior experiences, assuming them to be representative of the
larger class.167 Such non-Bayesian reasoning could well induce a
type of local-lock-in effect in which certain firms tend to push a
contract mutation while other clusters tend to hold fast to the traditional term. Inquiries such as these represent an interesting
and potentially fertile area to generalize and deploy our framework. Although we leave them for future endeavors, we note that
a precondition to even beginning to incorporate such biases is the
existence of a holistic framework for thinking about how and
when contract terms evolve—and this Article has provided such
a framework.
CONCLUSION
When Tiffany and LVMH triumphantly announced their acquisition agreement in late 2019, they did so at a moment that we
would soon come to identify as the temporal dividing line between
the “before times” and our post-pandemic world. Although such
watershed moments are (fortunately) infrequent, they also create
166 We note that in related work, we were not able to find strong evidence of tradeoffs
between RTFs and pandemic carveouts. See generally Matthew Jennejohn, Julian Nyarko
& Eric Talley, COVID-19 as a Force Majeure in Corporate Transactions (Colum. L. & Econ.
Working Paper No. 625, 2020), https://perma.cc/66QL-UVX8. In light of our framework,
this observation casts doubt on the extent to which efficient nonprice horse trading occurs
in this context (at least as related to RTFs).
167 See generally, e.g., JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING (3d ed. 2000) (describing a variety of cognitive phenomena that limit human rationality); Daniel
Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Subjective Probability: A Judgment of Representativeness, 3
COGNITIVE PSYCH. 430 (1972) (exploring how the “representativeness” cognitive heuristic
results in predictable and systematic errors in evaluation of uncertain events).
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an opportunity for scholars to consider whether and how commercial practices evolve as such events unfold and potentially change
the rules of the game. In so doing, such practices can also
change law.
In this Article, we have used our current watershed moment
in history as an invitation to analyze more rigorously how contracting practices evolve over time in the context of a changing
environment. We have developed and analyzed a holistic model of
contract-term evolution that delivers insights about how economics, information, learning, and lawyering interact to shape contracting practices—and to change law in the process. These insights, moreover, can be directly compared to measurable
empirical trends in contract practices, which we document using
two decades’ worth of M&A contract terms. This comparison suggests that term diffusion and evolution is not a monolithic phenomenon but instead unfolds differently according to context.
While some trends bear the markers of efficient markets, others
appear to manifest behavior more consistent with other patterns,
such as cascades or black holes. And in turn, our analysis allows
us to situate many of the stylized accounts of term evolution as
special cases of our more general framework.
Although our study contributes to a more systematic accounting of the literature on contract-term evolution, it also can be easily extended to take on other phenomena not examined here. We
have posited a few such applications, including using our framework to assess whether complex contract negotiation displays features of bartering, in which concessions on nonprice terms are
traded off rather than accounted for in the price. Our analysis can
also help open up a more general and testable theory of when and
how behavioral biases affect contracting trends and whether
countervailing forces are able to counteract them. Much of where
these extensions ultimately lead is yet to be seen. But we conjecture that in many applications, it is likely that contracting—and
not love—will prevail.
APPENDIX: FORMAL ANALYSIS OF MODEL
For more technically minded readers, this Appendix presents
in a more formal fashion the model outlined informally in the
main text. There are five key sets of assumptions that frame this
inquiry. They are summarized as follows:
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(1) Nonprice terms constitute a central vehicle through
which negotiating parties are able to make value in a contractual setting.
(2) Most of the negotiation over, and search for, such
nonprice terms is done by attorneys outside the firm who
are specialists in negotiating deals on behalf of their clients but are not directly supervised by their clients.
(3) In negotiating a nonprice term, counsel typically start
with a default term and then consider whether an alteration to that the default term—a mutation—should replace it.
(4) Counsel will adopt the mutation only if they consider it to
be value enhancing to a sufficient degree.
(5) Counsel bargain over whether to adopt the mutation using two sources of information:
• First, they have some (imperfect) ability to discern
whether the deal in front of them is a better fit with
the status quo term or the mutation.
• Second, counsel have experiences from prior deals
that they have negotiated, which they can leverage to
benchmark their inklings about the current deal. This
includes the prior experience of counsel in adopting
(or rejecting) the mutation.
Each of these assumptions is, we believe, defensible for reasons described in Part II. We formalize each of them below within
an environment that we make as simple as possible while still
capturing the steps articulated above. In walking through the
analysis below, we frequently illustrate intermediate outcomes by
imposing the numerical values from our benchmark simulations
in Part II.C of the text (pictured in Figure 1).
A. Deal Sequence and Population of Firms
Our model unfolds dynamically over discrete time increments
denoted by 𝑡 ∈ {1, 2, 3. . . }. In each period 𝑡, a potential acquisition
deal emerges involving a buyer 𝑏 who values the asset at 𝑣𝑏 > 0
and a seller 𝑠 who values it at 𝑣𝑠 > 0 (where these values are
benchmarked against a deal that is executed pursuant to a standard form contract). The realized values of 𝑣𝑏 and 𝑣𝑠 are drawn
randomly from a distribution function 𝐹(𝑣𝑏 , 𝑣𝑠 ). The buyer and
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seller observe these values and pursue a transaction only if 𝑣𝑏 >
𝑣𝑠 ; and thus, in the most general setting, there can be some periods in which there is a deal struck. For purposes of our benchmark analysis, however, we will assume that each potential
transaction yields a deal with probability equal to one.
To execute a deal, the buyer and seller each must work with
outside legal counsel. Their choices must be taken from a universe
of 𝑁 law firms, indexed by 𝑖 = 1, 2, . . . 𝑁. Each firm is associated
with a (scalar) “reputational capital” value, which we denote by
the indexed variable θ𝑖 and which we normalize between 0 and 1.
The 𝑁-dimensional vector of reputations is denoted Θ ≡ {θ𝑖 , θ𝑖 , . . .
θ𝑁 }. For each period’s transaction (i.e., a consummating buyerseller pair) the parties must select two different law firms to represent them from the population. We represent this pairing process to unfold according to a probabilistic selection matrix 𝑃 pictured as follows:
MATRIX A1: MERGER REPRESENTATION
0
𝑝2,1
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𝑃=
∙
∙
[ 𝑝𝑁,1

𝑝1,2
0
∙
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∙

∙
∙
∙
∙
0
𝑝𝑁,𝑁−1

𝑝1,𝑁
∙
∙
∙
𝑝𝑁−1,𝑁
0 ]

Each row of the matrix corresponds to the firm representing
the buyer and each column corresponds to the firm representing
the seller. We keep the structure of 𝑃 deliberately general at this
stage, other than to require that all entries along the diagonal
must be zero (no law firm is allowed to represent both buyers and
sellers simultaneously), and its remaining components must add
up to one. Thus, for example, the component probabilities might
be scaled to firm reputational capital.
In our benchmark analysis, we assume that there are ten
firms, each of which has identical reputational capital of ½. Consequently, the probabilistic-assignment matrix is effectively random among the firms, and thus each nondiagonal element represents one permutation of distinct assignment of the firms to the
buyer and seller.

2022]

Contractual Evolution

967

MATRIX A2: MERGER REPRESENTATION FOR TEN FIRMS
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Figure A1 conceptually lays out a representative transaction
occurring at period 𝑡 that is assigned to two specific firms in the
eligible population (one for the buyer and one for the seller). Each
circle in the figure represents an individual law firm; in period 𝑡,
a transaction arrives and is assigned to representative law firms
𝑖 and 𝑗 (colored red for the buyer’s counsel and green for the
seller’s counsel) with probability 𝑝𝑖,𝑗 .
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FIGURE A1: TRANSACTION ASSIGNMENT IN EACH PERIOD t

A. Nonprice-Term Selection
As noted above, each transaction arrives in the hands of the
law firms with a default set of off-the-rack contract terms that
presumptively apply to the deal. Such default terms, for example,
may be those embedded in ABA model agreements or other wellknown market templates in the field. That said, once the counsel
have received a deal to execute, the legal teams can choose
whether to (a) follow the conventional contract terms or (b) adopt
a “mutation” that is inconsistent with convention.
To fix ideas, we suppose that the mutation will either increase or decrease the payoffs of both buyers and sellers by some
fixed amount 𝛼 > 0. Whether the mutation increases or decreases
both parties’ payoffs, however, may not be certain at the time of
contracting, and we assume transactions come in one of two flavors. For the first (which we call “Type 1,” denoted T1), the mutation is value destroying, and each party loses 𝛼 if the mutation is
adopted. For the other flavor (which we call “Type 2,” denoted T2),
the mutation is value enhancing and each party gains α. Thus, if
the buyer and seller accurately identify which type of transaction
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they are facing, adopting an efficient nonprice term (the conventional term or the mutation) is straightforward.168
We assume, however, that such identification is not always
possible—at least with precision. In our framework, the attorneys
(and possibly even clients) have imperfect information about
whether their transaction is a T1 or T2 transaction, and thus the
best that they can do is assess a probabilistic likelihood about this
critical piece of information. In making this assessment, transactional lawyers will draw on three pieces of information: (a) their
prior beliefs about the overall representation of T1 and T2 deals,
(b) their (potentially inaccurate) assessment of the type of the
transaction they are negotiating, and (c) their collective experience in adopting (or rejecting) the mutation term in prior transactions. We address each of these below.
Before doing so, however, we first observe that because the
parties are bargaining with symmetric (albeit imperfect) information, they will adopt the mutation if and only if—given their
joint information at the time of bargaining—the mutation seems
likely to bring about an increase in expected value with some critical probability (which we denote as 𝑞). Consequently, the decision about whether each bargaining team at time 𝑡 will adopt the
mutation turns on the information they have at the time about its
net benefits (relative to the conventional term). This information
set is the core vehicle through which actors learn in our model. In
all our benchmark simulations, we will assume that 𝑞 = ½, and
thus the parties will adopt the mutation whenever it increases
joint expected payoffs.169
We now proceed to describe the means by which the parties
learn about transactions over time and from one another.

168 This approach to a mutation is obviously a simplification, since many (if not most)
alterations to nonprice terms seem likely to hurt one player and help the other. Such a
caveat is easily accommodated in our framework at the cost of some additional notation.
For example, our framework can be adapted to the situation where the mutation actually
consists of dual changes to two nonprice terms—one of which helps the seller and the other
of which helps the buyer. Under this account, the parties will horse trade to implement
the dual changes if their joint effect is expected to be mutually beneficial. In such a scenario, one could reinterpret the value of the mutation to represent the joint gains from the
dual mutation.
169 If the parties are risk averse, the cutoff value for 𝑞 might be larger than ½. Our
framework easily accommodates this possibility.
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1. Prior beliefs.
We start with the parties’ prior beliefs, which effectively reduce to the assessed likelihood that a randomly selected transaction is T1 or T2. This probabilistic assessment, of course, must be
directly related to the proportion of potential deals that are of
each type in the population. (For example, if 60% of the deals in
the population of potential deals were T1, then it’s pretty clear
that a randomly selected deal from the population would have a
60% likelihood of being T1 and a 40% likelihood of being T2.) That
said, within our framework, even this proportion is not known
with certainty. Rather, we suppose that the true population characteristics could be skewed in either direction, so that a Δ% fraction of the potential transactions are either T1 or T2, where Δ is
a fixed parameter value such that Δ < 50%. More formally, if we
let random variable 𝑍 denote the fraction of transactions that are
T1 (and thus the complementary fraction (1 − 𝑍) is T2), then we
suppose that there are two possible configurations to the world:
either (𝑍, 1 − 𝑍) = (Δ, 1 − Δ) or (𝑍, 1 − 𝑍) = (1 − Δ, Δ). Significantly, however, the parties are uncertain about the realization
of 𝑍, and thus they do not know whether the Δ proportion applies
to T1 deals (so that the majority (1 − Δ)% of deals are of type T2)
or to T2 deals (so that the majority (1 − Δ)% of deals are type T1).
Which of these alternative situations constitutes the “ground
truth” cannot be resolved with certainty. But we assume that all
players begin with a common population-wide prior probability
about the world as follows:
EQUATION A1: PRIOR BELIEF THAT T1 DEALS ARE THE MINORITY
𝑃𝑟 {𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑓𝑇1𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑠 = Δ} = 𝑟0
EQUATION A2: PRIOR BELIEF THAT T1 DEALS ARE THE MAJORITY
𝑃𝑟 {𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑓𝑇1𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑠 = 1 − Δ} = 1 − 𝑟0
In other words, all parties believe that T1 deals constitute the
majority of transactions with probability 1 − 𝑟0 and a minority of
transactions with probability 𝑟0 . Conversely, they believe that T2
deals constitute the majority of transactions with probability 𝑟0
and a minority of transactions with probability 1 − 𝑟0 . Although
nothing in our model requires it, we initially assume that the conventional contract terms are there for a reason—and the parties’
a priori assessment is that 𝑟0 < ½, indicating that most transactions are believed to be T1. Equivalently, then, the “conventional”
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term is initially believed to be the most appropriate provision for
most transactions. In our benchmark simulation, we assume that
𝑟0 = 0.05 and that the relative percentage composition of T1 and
T2 firms is 30% and 70%, so that Δ = 0.3. Thus, in the benchmark
case, there is a one-in-twenty chance that the mutation enjoys the
70–30 majority of potential deals, and a nineteen-in-twenty
chance that the 70–30 split favors the conventional term.
The process is illustrated in Figure A2, which visually depicts
this prior-belief process as well as the true state of play. In the
figure, chance determines whether T1 deals (shown in red) constitute a majority (1 − Δ)% of the population or a minority Δ%.
The corresponding probabilities that T2 deals (shown in orange)
are in the majority is 𝑟0 , and, respectively, in the minority is
(1 − 𝑟0 ). As can be seen from Figure A2, only if T1 deals are in the
minority and T2 deals are in the majority (the left branch) will
the mutation be, on average, value enhancing. Instead, if T1 deals
are in the majority (the right branch), the conventional term will
be (on average) the most efficient. The transaction that emerges
is assumed to be a random draw from the resulting population of
deals (whatever the ground-truth reality is on the mix of T1 and
T2 representation).
FIGURE A2: SEQUENCE AND INFORMATION STRUCTURE

Absent any additional information, then, the parties would
have to rely on their prior beliefs about the population averages
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to determine whether the standard term or the mutation is appropriate. And if 𝑟0 = 0.05 < ½, as our benchmark example assumes, then they would never adopt the mutation. If, on the other
hand, counsel could also draw on additional information that is
probative of the deal before them, then their prior beliefs would
inform—but would not fully determine—the contractual term
chosen. How exactly the firm weighs prior beliefs against dealspecific information is described below.
2. Assessment of instant transaction.
In addition to their prior beliefs, the transacting parties are
also able to assess certain “noisy” facts about the specific transaction before them, effectively obtaining an informative signal
about which type of transaction they are negotiating. If this signal
were 100% accurate, then it would overwhelm prior beliefs to the
parties in structuring their contract, since it would allow them to
design a contract that is a perfect fit to the type of deal. On the
other hand, if the signal is noisy or the parties sometimes interpret the signal incorrectly, then they would tend to combine the
content of the signal with their prior beliefs in a way to make an
“all-things-considered” assessment of whether the mutation or
the conventional term is warranted.
Thus, when a new transaction arrives and the buyer’s and
seller’s counsel are selected, they jointly observe a noisy signal as
to whether their particular deal is T1 or T2. The possible signal
realizations are denoted as t1 and t2, where 𝛾 ∈ (½, 1) embodies
the signal’s precision, as per the following conditional probability
table:
TABLE A1: DEAL-SPECIFIC SIGNALS AND TRUE DEAL TYPES
(PRECISION = 𝛾)
↓Signal Observed \ True Type→

T1

T2

t1

γ

1−γ

t2

1−γ

γ

Note that when γ = 1, the signal is perfect, and thus the parties know precisely which type of deal they have before them. In
contrast, when γ = ½, the signal is wholly uninformative, and the
parties cannot use it to refine their beliefs about the transaction.
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For intermediate values of γ between ½ and 1, the signal is partially informative, and the parties may use it (along with other
information) to inform their beliefs. In our benchmark example,
we will assume that γ = 0.6 so that the observed individual signal
about the transaction is accurate 60% of the time and incorrect
40% of the time.
3. Prior experience of transacting law firms.
Finally, our framework presumes (like the real world) that
counsel are repeat players in deal structuring, and they therefore
bring their prior experiences and wisdom to the table. In particular, in addition to prior beliefs and their signal about the instant
transaction described above, counsel are also able to look back to
previous deals in order to further refine their experiential
knowledge about the population, giving them added knowledge
about when the mutation is (and is not) likely to be a good fit.
Here, we assume that, for purposes of the instant transaction,
counsel for buyer and seller are able to pool the signals that they
have individually received from recent prior deals that their firms
have negotiated. Such information would not be generally available to the public, but instead is housed in the institutional
memory of the transacting firms. Here, we suppose that each
side’s legal team is able to look backward over a given number of
periods at the deals (if any) that they played a role in negotiating.
We denote the look-back period by the integer variable 𝐿; for the
buyer’s counsel, we denote Yb as the number of deals counsel was
involved in during the look-back period, with 𝑘𝑏 of those deals involving the observation of the t1 signal. Similarly, for the seller’s
counsel, we denote Ys as the prior deals participated in during the
look-back period, with ks representing the number of times
buyer’s counsel has observed the t1 signal in those deals. At the
negotiation table, counsel pool their collection of observations (adjusting as necessary the counts for any prior deals when the two
firms negotiated with each other and thus observed the same signals). This process results in what is effectively a joint experiential data set for the negotiating parties, consisting of 𝑌 prior deals
where the signal t1 appeared 𝑘 times.170 Although the values of 𝑌
and 𝑘𝑏 will be dependent on the random matching of firms, we

170 In all our simulations, we accounted for the possibility that the two law firms may
have shared prior common deals, taking pains to avoid double counting such experiences.
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assume in our benchmark model that counsel is able to look to the
beginning of the simulation.
4. Updated posterior beliefs.
The three pieces of information noted above—prior beliefs
(𝑟0 ), a noisy signal about the instant transaction (γ), and pooled
information from prior transactions (𝑌, 𝑘)—allow the parties to refine and update their beliefs about the optimal term for the transaction that they are negotiating. In doing so, our baseline framework assumes that the parties use Bayes’s rule to combine these
pieces of information.171
Consider first how the parties might combine only their prior
beliefs and their pooled information (disregarding the contribution of the signal they observe about the instant transaction).
Here, applying Bayes’s rule, it is straightforward to confirm that
the parties would have the following interim beliefs about the
population-wide ratio of mutation-favoring contracts:
EQUATION A3: UPDATED BELIEF ABOUT POPULATION
𝑟0
𝑟̂ (𝑟0 , γ, 𝑌, 𝑘) =
1 − γ − Δ + 2Δγ 𝑌−2𝑘
𝑟0 + (1 − 𝑟0 ) ( γ + Δ − 2Δγ )
Although this interim belief does not yet incorporate anything about the signal that pertains to the instant deal, a few things
are worth pointing out. First, when the contracting parties have
prior experiences in negotiating this type of deal (so that 𝑌 = 0
and 𝑘 = 0), the expression simplifies to 𝑟̂ (𝑟0 , γ,0,0) = 𝑟0 . This
makes sense, because a lack of prior experience implies that the
best information the negotiating parties have is their ex ante priors. Similarly, note that when the signals that the parties observed from past deals are extremely imprecise (γ = ½), the expression similarly simplifies to 𝑟̂ (𝑟0 , ½, 𝑌, 𝑘) = 𝑟0. This is also
intuitive, since it means that the parties can learn nothing from
their data set of prior signals. Finally, note that when 𝑟0 takes on
extreme values of zero or one (so that the parties have irrebuttably strong prior beliefs), no amount of prior experience will shake
them from that view. Finally, note that in our benchmark model,
this expression simplifies somewhat after plugging in the
assumed values of 𝑟0 and γ:
171

For a definition and explanation of Bayes’s rule, see supra note 66.
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EQUATION A4: EQUATION A3 FOR BENCHMARK MODEL
𝑟̂ (0.05, 0.6, 𝑌, 𝑘) =

1
23 𝑌−2𝑘
1 + 19 ( )
27

Now consider how the signal observed about the actual deal
in front of the parties is combined with the probabilistic assessment from equation (2) of mutation-favoring deals. Because the
signal reveals tailored information about the specific deal at
issue, the parties would generate different “posterior” beliefs
about whether the signal suggested a T1 deal (with signal t1) or
a T2 deal (with signal t2). We can once again apply Bayes’s rule
to each type of signal, as follows. If signal t1 was observed, then
the parties’ posterior beliefs that the current deal is T1 are given
by π1 :
EQUATION A5: UPDATED BELIEF THAT SPECIFIC DEAL IS T1 IF
FIRM OBSERVES t1 SIGNAL
π1  =

1
1−γ
𝑟̂ + Δ − 2Δ𝑟̂
1+(
)(
)
γ
1 + 2Δ𝑟̂ − 𝑟̂ − Δ

Conversely, if signal t2 was observed, then the parties’ posterior beliefs that the current deal is T1 are given by π2 :
EQUATION A6: UPDATED BELIEF FOR SPECIFIC DEAL IS T1 IF
FIRM OBSERVES t2
π2  =

1
γ
𝑟̂ + Δ − 2Δ𝑟̂
1 + (1 − γ) (
)
1 + 2Δ𝑟̂ − 𝑟̂ − Δ

Note that the only difference between these two posterior be1−γ
liefs is the inversion of the likelihood ratio ( γ ) in the denomina-

tor. And, because γ > ½, it follows that π1 > π2 , implying (intuitively) that the parties’ belief about a T1 transaction (favoring the
status quo term) should increase if they observe signal t1, and
similarly their belief about a T2 transaction should increase if
they observe signal t2.
Once again imposing the parametric values of our baseline
simulation on these expressions, they simplify somewhat as
follows:
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EQUATION A7: EQUATION A5 FOR BENCHMARK MODEL
π1 =

21 − 12𝑟̂
27 − 4𝑟̂

EQUATION A8: EQUATION A6 FOR BENCHMARK MODEL
π2 =

14 − 8𝑟̂
23 + 4𝑟̂

5. Term adoption.
Given the information that they assembled through experience and direct observation, the parties will favor the mutation
over the conventional term only if their posterior belief indicates
that the likelihood of a T2 deal is sufficiently strong. Although we
will explore alternative definitions of that concept below, we suppose for now that the key criterion is a more-likely-than-not criterion (which would coincide with designing a contract that is efficient in expectation). In some cases, the parties’ joint experience
may be so strong that it overwhelms anything that they might
learn from the deal-specific signal they receive. In other cases, the
signal is dispositive. Figure A3 illustrates this point by focusing
on the strength of the parties’ collective prior beliefs, or 𝑟̂ , based
on their collective experiences. Note that when these beliefs
strongly suggest that mutation-friendly deals are rare (𝑟̂ < ρ <
½), the parties will generally favor the standard term regardless
of the signal. In contrast, when their beliefs strongly suggest that
mutation-friendly deals are very common (𝑟̂ > ρ > ½), they will
similarly favor the mutation regardless of the signal. When their
prior beliefs are more moderate, however (𝜌 < 𝑟̂ < ρ), the parties’
choice of term will hinge on the signal they observe (with t1 favoring the conventional term and t2 favoring the mutation).172

172

It is easily confirmed that = γ−½ and 1−γ−½.
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FIGURE A3: JOINT BELIEFS AND SIGNAL DEPENDENCE

In our benchmark model, this set of trade-offs can be easily
illustrated using Figure A4. The horizontal axis denotes the updated beliefs, 𝑟̂ , that the parties have coming into bargaining
based on their joint prior transactions (per Equations A5–A6
above). The blue line denotes the posterior assessment they would
have that the transaction is a T1 transaction after having observed a t1 signal, while the orange line denotes the posterior beliefs that the transaction is T1, having observed a t2 signal. Note
that if their updated beliefs are below approximately 𝑟̂ = 0.17, the
parties will always adopt the conventional term regardless of signal. Conversely, if their updated beliefs are above a cutoff of approximately 𝑟̂ = 0.75, they will always adopt the mutation. For
intermediate values, their signal dictates the transaction that
they enter into.
FIGURE A4: INTERIM AND POSTERIOR BELIEFS, AND TERM
ADOPTION (BENCHMARK CASE)

Collecting all the insights from above, we arrive at the following proposition:
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Proposition: Consider a pair of negotiating parties at round
t with joint signal history ⟨𝑘; 𝑁⟩ as derived above. The parties
will choose the relevant nonprice contract term as follows:
1

• If 𝑟̂ > 𝜌 > , the mutation is chosen regardless of the
2
signal observed.
1

• If 𝑟̂ < 𝜌 < 2, the conventional term is chosen regardless
of the signal observed.
• If 𝜌 < 𝑟̂ < 𝜌), the mutation is chosen if and only if the
parties observe signal t2,
𝛾−𝛥

where 𝜌 = 1−2𝛥 and 𝜌 ≡

1−𝛾−𝛥
.
1−2𝛥

The expressions from the above proposition drive each of our simulation paths presented in the main text.

